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PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER  
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:  
WHY FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION  
COUNTS AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
Richard A. Epstein* 
On its fiftieth anniversary, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enjoys 
widespread social support on all sides of the political spectrum. That support is 
fully deserved to the extent that the nondiscrimination in public accommodations 
provisions offset the monopoly power of common carriers and public utilities, or 
neutralize the abusive application of public power and private violence to sup-
press the free entry of firms that would otherwise target minority customers in 
competitive markets. 
The subsequent expansion of Title II’s nondiscrimination principle becomes 
much more difficult to justify, however, when applied to normal businesses when 
segregationist forces no longer hold sway. In particular, these principles are sus-
pect when applied to membership organizations that care about their joint gov-
ernance and common objectives. In these cases, the principles of freedom of as-
sociation should constitutionally protect all groups, even those that do not fall 
under the uncertain rubric of expressive associations.  
The application of the modern antidiscrimination rules for public accommo-
dations to Christian groups who are opposed to gay marriage on moral principle 
represents a regrettable inversion of the original purpose of Title II, using state 
power to force these groups to the unpalatable choice of exiting the market or 
complying with these modern human rights laws that prohibit any discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation. These rules should be struck down even if the 
other antidiscrimination prohibitions represent a group of settled expectations 
that no one today wishes to overturn.  
 
 
 * Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished 
Service Professor Emeritus of Law and Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. 
My thanks to Lauren Barnett for her valuable research assistance, and to the Symposium par-
ticipants for their instructive comments on, and disagreements with, an earlier version of this 
Essay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fiftieth anniversary of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has 
been, and will continue to be, a source of remembrance and reflection. Like 
many people of my generation, I believed then, as I believe today, that its pas-
sage was a defining moment in American culture, which had for far too long 
tolerated state-sanctioned segregation backed by massive social intolerance. At 
the time, the civil rights movement had priorities that are accurately reflected in 
the order of its particular titles. Title I, which dealt with voting, was first and 
foremost on everyone’s mind because the overt and systematic exclusion of Af-
rican Americans from the polls was as complete an affront to full citizenship as 
anyone could imagine. Next in line was Title II, which dealt with the question 
of public accommodations. Title VII, which dealt with employment discrimina-
tion, was way down on the list, as it should have been.1 
Title II was passed when memories were still fresh of the many indignities 
that had been inflicted on African American citizens on a routine basis. It took 
little imagination to understand that something was deeply wrong with a nation 
in which it was difficult, if not impossible, for African American citizens to se-
cure food, transportation, and lodging when traveling from place to place in 
large sections of the country. In some instances, no such facilities were availa-
ble, and in other cases they were only available on limited and unequal terms. 
As someone who came of age (quite literally) when the Civil Rights Act was 
passed, it is easy to recall how widespread moral outrage propelled the statute 
to its passage. The sit-ins in Southern and border states were still fresh in the 
memories of the general public.2 Those memories come flooding back with 
 
 1. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (critiquing Title VII and calling for its repeal in competitive 
labor markets).  
 2. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 239-42 (1964) (remanding a case involving 
several criminal convictions resulting from a sit-in protest to the Maryland Court of Appeals 
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more recent historical accounts of the earlier times. Just recently, I read Isabel 
Wilkerson’s The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great 
Migration, which contains personalized accounts of how difficult it was for 
black people, fearing violent retribution, to sneak out of the South on segregat-
ed trains in their efforts to make it to the North.3 And Wilkerson’s account of 
how Robert Joseph Pershing Foster was unable to find sleeping accommoda-
tions in Arizona on his migration to California in 1953 shows all too vividly 
that the practices of segregation extended far beyond the boundaries of the Old 
South.4 Indeed, it can be taken as a vindication of Title II that its commands 
have rarely been the subject of litigation after the initial skirmishes on its con-
stitutionality were decided shortly after passage of the Civil Rights Act.5 The 
sign of successful legislative reform is its widespread social acceptance, which 
has certainly been the case for Title II.  
In one sense, therefore, it is proper to treat the fiftieth anniversary of Title 
II as occasion for unrestrained celebration of legislation that has both met and 
exceeded the expectations at the time of its passage. But at the same time, the 
passage of a successful piece of legislation should give rise to at least some 
level of reflection about the principles on which that legislation rests and their 
soundness for general applicability. On this score, the inquiry goes off on two 
branches. For the first, it turns out that the original design of Title II contains its 
fair share of conceptual and practical difficulties, relating both to the terms of 
its passage on the one hand and its precedential value on the other. The para-
digmatic case of Title II’s application in 1964 was against monopolists who 
used their powers of exclusion to limit the options of politically vulnerable per-
sons.6 Historically, the dominant white segregationists who controlled the polls, 
the police, and all key government positions exercised in combination a level of 
state monopoly power that no simple public utility could hope to match. It was 
against the backdrop of this unified phalanx that the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 has to be understood.  
For the second, the resurgence of Title II-type obligations under modern 
“human rights laws” indicates a serious and regrettable reversal of fortune with 
respect to the basic function of this legislation. Under pressure from modern 
civil rights advocates, the worm has unfortunately turned, as people have lost 
sight of the evils that a public accommodations law should combat. The new 
application of the next generation of human rights law has the exact opposite 
 
for reconsideration in light of the supervening passage of city and state public accommoda-
tions laws). 
 3. See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF 
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2011). 
 4. See id. at 206-10. 
 5. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 6. See id. at 261. 
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orientation: may the state force small and isolated businesses, often with Chris-
tian beliefs, to violate their bona fide religious beliefs in order to provide ser-
vices in highly competitive market segments? The fact that the two problems 
are both seen to justify strong government intervention offers powerful evi-
dence of an unfortunate change in the dominant social attitudes toward the pub-
lic use of force. 
In order to work out the development of this theme, I shall proceed as fol-
lows. In Part I, I shall set out in brief fashion the essential structure of Title II, 
which, at least in form, has become the template against which all modern hu-
man rights laws are measured. In Part II, I shall examine the substantive sound-
ness of the modern civil rights laws when tested against the standards for anti-
discrimination laws developed in various common law contexts. In so doing, I 
shall pay special attention to the controversial critique of public accommoda-
tion laws offered by the late Robert Bork in The New Republic in August 
1963.7 In Parts III and IV, I shall trace the evolution of public accommodations 
laws into human rights laws that first addressed the position of large organiza-
tions like the Jaycees and the Boy Scouts, but later extended their influence to 
small, often fundamentalist groups that are frequently powerless to protect 
themselves against the rigors of majoritarian political processes. In Part V, I 
shall address the new set of dangers that arise when governments, at both the 
federal and state levels, use their monopoly powers over highways and other 
public facilities to exclude those groups whose internal practices are incon-
sistent with the preferred set of public norms. A civil rights program that at one 
time protected individual liberty and choice has by degrees become an instru-
ment of repression in the hands of public and private groups. Even on a cele-
bratory occasion, therefore, it is important to keep our intellectual distance and 
subject it to some serious scrutiny, which is what this Essay attempts to do. 
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME  
In order to put this inquiry into perspective, it is critical to set out the spe-
cific guarantees contained in Title II, paying special attention to their scope and 
underlying rationale. The initial section sets out the basic guarantee: “All per-
sons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public ac-
commodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation 
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”8 
Once that is established, subsection (b) of the legislation then lists the types 
of accommodations that fall within the general ambit of the Act.  
 
 7. Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21. 
 8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
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 Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of 
public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect 
commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State ac-
tion: 
 (1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to 
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which 
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occu-
pied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence; 
 (2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or 
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the prem-
ises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of 
any retail establishment; or any gasoline station; 
 (3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or 
other place of exhibition or entertainment; and 
 (4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premis-
es of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the 
premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and 
(B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.9 
These provisions have to be read in light of the narrow exemption that is 
found in subsection (e), which reads: “The provisions of this title shall not ap-
ply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except 
to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the 
customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b).”10 
In addition to these basic coverage provisions, Title II also contains subsec-
tions (c) and (d), which are intended to secure the proper constitutional basis 
for the substantive provisions just set out above. Thus subsection (c) offers a 
very broad definition of what it means for the “operations of an establishment” 
to “affect commerce,” which includes the service at these establishment of in-
terstate travelers or the use of food, gasoline, or other products that “move[] in 
[interstate] commerce.”11 Subsection (d) then gives a definition of the meaning 
of state action under the provision, which includes all conduct carried out under 
the color of state law or custom or required by any state or political subdivision 
thereof.12 There is no question that these provisions received extra attention in 
order to avoid the fate of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,13 which had been de-
 
 9. Id. § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). 
 10. Id. § 201(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). 
 11. Id. § 201(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c). 
 12. Id. § 201(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d). 
 13. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Its basic provision read:  
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal 
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to 
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clared unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases on the ground that 
“[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Four-
teenth] Amendment.”14 Nor could the Civil Rights Act of 1875 reach those 
forms of private action that were outside the scope of interstate commerce as 
that phrase was understood at the time, which roughly speaking was limited to 
any journey that involved two or more states.15 It is commonly overlooked—I 
plead guilty to the offense—that Title II does not explicitly apply to retail es-
tablishments,16 which thus fall into a limbo between the explicit command of 
Title II and its narrower exception, which has been plugged in large measure by 
the human rights laws of the next generation.17 It is worthwhile examining both 
the substantive soundness of the basic provisions of Title II and its constitu-
tional basis in some detail. It is equally important to note that the Commerce 
Clause restraint drops out with respect to state human rights laws, even though 
the various property right restrictions on government remain very much in play.  
II. SUBSTANTIVE SOUNDNESS  
In the run-up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, most serious 
commentators had little doubt about the moral imperative behind passage of 
Title II of the Act. In light of the earlier court precedents, they were far more 
worried about its constitutional foundations for congressional action. The nota-
ble exception to that consensus was the ever-contrarian Robert Bork, who in 
August 1963 wrote a scathing critique of Title II in the New Republic on the 
ground that it offended the basic principle of freedom of association, which he 
regarded as a fundamental norm of any sound political order. One key passage 
reads as follows: 
The legislature would inform a substantial body of the citizenry that in order 
to continue to carry on the trades in which they are established they must deal 
with and serve persons with whom they do not wish to associate. In part the 
willingness to overlook that loss of freedom arises from the feeling that it is ir-
rational to choose associates on the basis of racial characteristics. Behind that 
judgment, however, lies an unexpressed natural-law view that some personal 
preferences are rational, that others are irrational, and that a majority may im-
pose on a minority its scale of preferences. The fact that the coerced scale of 
 
the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every 
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. 
Id. § 1, 18 Stat. at 336. 
 14. 109 U.S. at 11. 
 15. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 566 (1870).  
 16. The point is driven home at great length in Joseph William Singer, No Right to Ex-
clude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1288-93 
(1996). 
 17. See infra Part IV.A.  
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preferences is said to be rooted in a moral order does not alter the impact upon 
freedom. . . . Of the ugliness of racial discrimination there need be no argu-
ment (though there may be some presumption in identifying one’s own hotly 
controverted aims with the objective of the nation). But it is one thing when 
stubborn people express their racial antipathies in laws which prevent individ-
uals, whether white or Negro, from dealing with those who are willing to deal 
with them, and quite another to tell them that even as individuals they may not 
act on their racial preferences in particular areas of life. The principle of such 
legislation is that if I find your behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aes-
thetic, and if you prove stubborn about adopting my view of the situation, I am 
justified in having the state coerce you into more righteous paths. That is itself 
a principle of unsurpassed ugliness.18 
That passage, especially its last four words, has provoked outrage that has 
spanned generations. Although Bork tried to distance himself from this piece, 
mere recollection of the phrase helped doom his 1987 nomination to the United 
States Supreme Court. Indeed, as recently as two years ago, that 1963 article 
formed part of the grounds for the People for the American Way, which played 
such a powerful role in derailing Bork’s 1987 nomination, to denounce Mitt 
Romney for the bad judgment of naming Bork as one of the co-chairs of the le-
gal advisory committee for his 2012 presidential campaign.19 Nonetheless, it is 
worthwhile in placing this passage in context to see the strengths and weak-
nesses of Bork’s broadside against Title II. The story yields a divided verdict. 
Let us start with the positive. There is little doubt that Bork is correct on 
his major premise that it is difficult to conceive of how a society can flourish if 
it does not respect the basic principle of freedom of association—the funda-
mental right that all individuals, regardless of race, sex, or age, have to choose 
the persons with whom they choose to do business. The logic behind this free-
dom of association principle runs as follows: Any legal system has to contain 
rules that first keep people apart (so that they will not kill each other). Yet at 
the same time, people have to be able to engage in various relationships with 
other individuals in order to reap the gains from voluntary interaction.  
Those gains can come about in two distinct ways. The first is through sim-
ple acts of exchange whereby one person sells goods or services to another. The 
basic economic logic of that exchange is that that the seller values the cash (or 
other nonmonetary consideration) received more than the goods or services sur-
rendered, while the buyer values the goods or services received more than she 
does the cash used to pay for them. Both sides thus benefit from the transaction, 
and each is in a position to make better use of the consideration received than 
of that surrendered. The seller can choose to use his added wealth to acquire or 
 
 18. Bork, supra note 7, at 22. 
 19. See, e.g., Jamie Raskin, Borking America: What Robert Bork Will Mean for the 
Supreme Court and American Justice, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/media-
center/publications/borking-america-20 (last visited June 8, 2014). 
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make new goods for sale, and the buyer can use her goods either for consump-
tion or resale. A successful transaction sets the stage for further beneficial in-
teractions with each other and with third parties. Legal systems may huff and 
puff about the exact conditions for valid exchanges, but they all recognize the 
category of sales and, along with it, similar two-party arrangements like leases, 
mortgages, bailments, and the like.  
The second source of potential gains does not involve transfer, but coop-
eration. Two or more individuals can pool their capital or labor in some form of 
partnership where they divide the gains as they see fit, typically in accordance 
with their respective contributions. These arrangements are governed by a full 
set of legal and social norms. The constant need for cooperation requires a 
higher level of affinity between parties. Many of their obligations are cast in the 
slippery but necessary terms of good faith; in essence, treat the welfare of your 
partner as equal to your own. One reason why parties are allowed to select their 
associates is that they pick those whom they tend to trust, which in turn creates 
a social glue that reduces the burden on the purely legal sanctions that are put 
in place to protect each trading partner against the potential default of others.  
It is, of course, an open question just how much trust is involved in differ-
ent kinds of relationships, or indeed among different relationships in the same 
class. As a rough generalization, people care a lot more about the choice of 
their long-term business associates than they do about the personal identity of 
people with whom they trade standard goods, at least in situations involving 
mass-produced goods. Hiring a worker is not like walking through the checkout 
line at Walgreens. But these general rules, even if sensible first approximations, 
are often subject to important exceptions. Some partnerships are large associa-
tions where the element of personal trust is relatively small. Some sales con-
tracts dealing with customized goods may require constant cooperation be-
tween buyers and sellers in order to successfully execute the transactions. In 
other cases, the element of trust is needed in large purchases when payment 
comes before performance or vice versa. Some service contracts involve close 
relations; others do not. The point here is not to catalog exhaustively all the 
permutations that can and do arise in well-developed voluntary markets. It is 
enough in this setting to know that the parties themselves are sensitive to these 
issues, so that the selection of terms and conditions can be left safely in private 
hands. The more personal the relationship is, the greater the selectivity in the 
contractual parties. It makes perfectly good sense that the sound selection of 
contracting parties can substantially reduce the risk of contractual breakdown 
by calling into play a set of informal sanctions that will not work with perfect 
strangers.  
The most important goal of public policy in this context is to make sure 
that government officials remember how little they know about the internal dy-
namics of the full range of voluntary transactions. These transactions are all en-
tered into by different parties, each with its own internal structure, history, and 
personnel. The organization makes its judgments with a full range of infor-
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mation that is not obtainable by outsiders no matter how hard they work. Any 
internal conflicts of interest—so called agency costs20—of which there are 
many, are tiny in comparison with the conflicts of interest between the business 
as a whole and its regulators who have no stake in the financial viability of the 
firm. Decentralization of public institutions thus is the order of the day.21 
It is therefore correct for any sound legal system to grant individuals free-
dom of choice in the full range of exchange and cooperative contexts. At one 
level, Bork’s position was so correct as a theoretical matter that it is hard to see 
what the shouting was about in 1963. But shouting there was, and even when 
that subsides, there are valid sources of criticism. I will not talk at length about 
Bork’s misuse of natural law theory, except to say that orthodox natural law 
theory lends no support to the proposition that “some personal preferences are 
rational, [and] that others are irrational.”22 Quite the opposite, it assumes that 
these preferences are personal and subjective and devotes its energy to articu-
lating the set of rules in which these preferences can be maximized in the famil-
iar fashion—controlling aggression and allowing for voluntary cooperation 
along lines that rest on a deeply utilitarian foundation.23 But if we put his un-
necessary philosophical digression to one side, there remain two important 
questions on which Bork falls short. The first is getting a proper theoretical un-
derstanding of the duties of common carriers. The second is adjusting social 
theory to take into account that the sometime manifest imperfection of power 
structures throughout the United States, but concentrated in the Old South, is 
about the institutional distribution of public powers. Both of these require some 
real explanation. 
A. Common Carriers  
One striking feature of Bork’s 1963 article was that it was written at the 
time that he was immersed in his articulation of a general theory of antitrust 
law. The central tenet of that theory, which he developed in connection with 
Ward Bowman, Jr., was that the single worthwhile objective of antitrust law is 
the control of monopoly practices. Thus in one famous article, Bork wrote that 
the only value worth defending in the antitrust law was “the maximization of 
 
 20. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976). 
 21. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 
(1945). 
 22. Bork, supra note 7, at 22. 
 23. See Richard A. Epstein, The Natural Law Influences on the First Generation of 
American Constitutional Law: Reflections on Philip Hamburger’s Law and Judicial Duty, 6 
J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 103, 112 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of 
Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713, 713 (1989) (pointing out the correspondence 
in key areas). 
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wealth or consumer want satisfaction.”24 That statement was echoed in many 
other articles that he wrote during this period, some alone and some with 
Bowman, whom he had first met when the two men were still at the University 
of Chicago.25 
Normatively, I think that there is a great deal to be said for this approach. 
The office of antitrust law is to distinguish between competition and monopoly 
and to make sure that legal intervention promotes the former and hampers the 
emergence of the latter. When Bork entered the antitrust field in the early 
1960s, most mainstream antitrust scholars thought that the law should serve all 
sorts of collateral objectives, including protecting small businesses against the 
rigors of competition.26 Bork did much to counteract those diversions in the 
law, arguing against the common belief that the simultaneous pursuit of multi-
ple objectives counts as some kind of social benefit. Bork was right to insist 
that the embrace of multiple inconsistent objectives often leads to intellectual 
confusion and the perpetuation of unwanted social losses. 
It is therefore a matter of great irony that the most glaring defect in Bork’s 
critique of Title II stems from his failure to recognize that antitrust law is not 
the only body of legal rules that is directed toward the control of monopoly. Of 
equal, or perhaps greater, importance is the legal response to the problem of 
natural monopoly that emerged somewhat earlier in the English law than did 
antitrust law, here in connection with those businesses that were, for good rea-
son, deemed “affected with a publick interest.”27 The key historical text for 
these purposes is Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale’s De Portibus Maris, which 
introduced that phrase into Anglo-American law. The basic point was that in 
some situations the party who sets up a wharf or a crane may have, either by 
nature or operation of law, a monopoly in providing a particular good or ser-
vice. In those cases, customers have no clear alternative place to go, so that the 
refusal to deal takes on far greater weight than it does in a purely competitive 
industry where there are many easily available options to purchase the same (or 
a very similar) good or service from a rival merchant. In those latter cases, it is 
 
 24. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & 
ECON. 7, 7 (1966); see also Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. 
REV. 577, 612 (1953); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21 (1957). 
 25. For some of that history, see Richard A. Epstein, Bork’s Bowman, “Not Gone, but 
Forgotten,” 79 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). 
 26. See, e.g., Robinson-Patman (Anti-Price Discrimination) Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 
74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012)) (seeking to deny large 
purchasers, then called chain stores, the advantages of volume purchases to the extent that 
they hurt smaller competitors).  
 27. MATTHEW HALE, De Portibus Maris, in A TREATISE, IN THREE PARTS (c. 1670), re-
printed in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND FROM 
MANUSCRIPTS 1, 78 (Francis Hargrave ed., London, T. Wright 1787). 
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not even possible to practice price discrimination because the high demanders 
will by definition have an opportunity to acquire the same good or service 
somewhere else at the competitive price. At this point, it can be said with some 
confidence that the market supplies, via its rules on free entry and exit, all the 
protection that any person needs. 
Those conditions do not hold with wharfs and cranes, and so the rule is 
otherwise. As Hale explains:  
 If the king or subject have a publick wharf, unto which all persons that 
come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the purpose, 
because they are wharfs the only licensed by the queen, according to the stat-
ute of I. El. cap II. or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall 
out where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary 
and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, [etc.,] neither can they be 
inhanced to an immoderate rate, but the duties must be reasonable and moder-
ate, though settled by the king’s license or charter. For now the wharf and 
crane and other conveniences are affected with a publick interest, and they 
cease to be juris privati only . . . .  
 . . . But in that case the king may limit by his charter, and license him to 
take reasonable tolls, though it be a new port or wharf, and made publick; be-
cause he is to be at the charge to maintain and repair it, and find those conven-
iences that are fit for it, as cranes and weights.28 
From this short passage, so is the business of general rate regulation born. 
The owner of these wharfs and cranes, or what became to be known as “essen-
tial facilities,”29 is first subject to a limit on what he can charge. But by the 
same token, he is entitled to receive sufficient revenues to allow him to main-
tain his business. That basic condition in turn requires that he be allowed to re-
cover the costs of his operation, both sunk and continuing, and make a competi-
tive rate of return on that investment, lest he take his capital elsewhere. In 
modern terms, the obligation is to respect the commitments to charge reasona-
ble and nondiscriminatory rates, typically called RAND or FRAND obliga-
tions, where the F stands for “fair.”30 The former requirement is to squeeze out 
the monopoly profits without exposing the regulated industry to the risk of con-
fiscation. The latter requirement is intended to make sure that the monopolist 
does not use its power over price to discriminate between more and less fa-
vored customers, including such divisions by race. 
 
 28. Id. at 77-78. I talk about these developments at great length in Richard A. Epstein, 
The History of Public Utility Rate Regulation in the United States Supreme Court: Of Rea-
sonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 345, 346-50 (2013). 
 29. See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989) (discussing the essential facilities doctrine). 
 30. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876, 877 & n.2 (9th Cir. 
2012) (using and explaining this terminology). 
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 I have written at great length of the many pitfalls that befall any effort to 
set the rates needed to avoid the twin risks of monopolization by the firm and 
confiscation by the state.31 But in these instances, much of the difficulty is 
eliminated by the nature of the problem. In dealing with routine passenger traf-
fic, there is no reason to discriminate in the treatment that is given to two cus-
tomers on the same train or bus. Any system of rate regulation can set the ap-
propriate tariffs. But unlike cases where the cost of service depends on the na-
nature of the goods that are shipped, there is a strong presumption that there is 
no reason to vary the rates charged to different customers in order to prevent 
any form of cross-subsidization, which, although widely practiced, is not ap-
propriate here any more than it is in competitive markets. The straightforward 
application of the nondiscrimination rule offers a powerful response to the dan-
gers of racial segregation, without having to resolve the separate question of 
what rates should be regarded as reasonable. It is for that reason that the prob-
lem of setting rates for ordinary passengers is relatively easy, at least compared 
to the business of setting rates for public utilities, where different classes of us-
ers require, arguably, very different forms of treatment because of major differ-
ences in the cost of providing service to them. To be sure, any modern transpor-
tation (or hotel or leasing) system takes steps to allow rates to shift in response 
to changes in demand and cost, so that no one expects that all passengers sitting 
on the same airplane have paid the same price for their tickets. But if time of 
departure or time of ticket purchase or method of purchase matter in this mar-
ket, race surely does not. It is hard to imagine any principled exceptions to this 
general rule, but, if any occur, they should be dealt with only when they arise, 
and not in setting the basic business framework. For example, unruly persons 
can be expelled from public transportation facilities for misbehavior, and if 
they engage in repeated offenses, they can be barred from use of the facilities 
altogether, even if that expulsion policy has some differential effect by race. On 
matters of sex, the historical record is a bit more complicated. In some docu-
mented instances, the boorish behavior of male passengers justified the use of 
special ladies’ cars to forestall various forms of sexual harassment.32 
The topic of common carriers deals extensively with various exercises of 
monopoly power, and thus overlaps with the topics of antitrust that preoccupied 
Bork at the time he wrote his New Republic article. To be sure, the antitrust so-
lutions do not work well with common carriers. One major office of antitrust 
law is intended to prevent cooperation between firms that can operate as inde-
pendent entities in competition with each other, which is why controlling car-
telization is the chief objective of that body of law, as Bork himself repeatedly 
 
 31. Epstein, supra note 28, at 346-50. 
 32. See BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, 
LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, at 280-82 (2001).  
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stressed.33 But what is astonishing is that Bork never connected the dots be-
tween these two areas of law. The simple point here is that the nondiscrimina-
tion provision should only apply to those cases where firms exert monopoly 
power over certain markets, which includes the usual forms of public transpor-
tation. But elsewhere, doctors, lawyers, plumbers, hair stylists, and a thousand 
other occupations, none of which are mentioned by Bork, should in principle be 
out from underneath the antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, it is standard econom-
ic theory that sellers cannot price discriminate in competitive markets with 
standard goods because the disadvantaged purchasers will shift to another sell-
er. To be sure, there are some tiny frictions in any real market, but these are so 
small that they can be safely disregarded in this context. It is therefore clear 
that we do not have to worry about the specter of forced association in the 
common trades with which Bork was so clearly concerned. He should have ac-
cepted the antidiscrimination principle of Title II, so long as it was confined to 
the monopoly-like situations to which it originally applied at common law. 
Stated otherwise, the general antitrust law is itself a principled limitation on the 
basic tenet of freedom of association insofar as it tells producers in the same 
industry that they cannot collude to reduce output and to raise prices. There is 
no reason why Bork should not have accepted that same principle for common 
carriers. It was his then-extreme version of libertarianism, not in evidence in 
the antitrust context, which got him into much of his trouble on questions of 
principle.  
It is, of course, the case that Bork repudiated his 1963 article in his book 
The Tempting of America, where he wrote: “My position was incorrect be-
cause . . . there are no general principles to decide competing claims of associa-
tion and nonassociation.”34 As was often typical of Bork, he leaped from one 
extreme to the other. In this context, the monopoly control position offers a 
principled way to deal with the rival claims. By moving to a kind of theoretical 
skepticism about this issue, Bork adopted a position that links all too well with 
his later affection for pure majoritarianism. If it turns out that no theory can re-
solve this profound difference, then the political majority might as well have 
the last say on that issue, at least until the winds of fortune shift in the opposite 
direction. In contrast, the monopoly control theory does not shift with the polit-
ical winds, an important consideration given the massive shifts in political 
power since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as is evident from the 
most cursory account of the historical realities leading up to the passage of that 
law. 
 
 33. Bork, supra note 24, at 7. 
 34. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 80 (1990). My thanks to Brian Landsberg for this useful reference. 
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B. The Historical Reality  
As is evident from the text of Title II, its focus on luncheon counters in res-
taurants—small businesses in highly competitive industries—indicates the 
weak fit between the traditional theory behind the antidiscrimination principle 
and the institutions to which it was targeted. If all that mattered was pure theo-
ry, individual owners of various diners could discriminate to their hearts’ con-
tent, as their customers would simply move over to some rival establishment 
down the street that was prepared to extend them service. Yet it is very clear 
that pure theory does a very poor job describing the historical practices of the 
Old South, where, to say the least, the prospect of free entry as a check against 
monopoly power was a snare and a delusion. It is important to ask the question 
of why the standard economic theory of competition failed so abjectly in prac-
tice. That failure does not come from technical mistakes within the theory. Ra-
ther, the explanation depends critically upon the totalitarian nature of the Old 
South, and much of the rest of the United States, which undercut the assump-
tion of free entry and exit on which the economic theory rests.  
The point here is quite simple. So long as people are free to leave, they 
cannot be exploited by those who wish to continue to employ their services. 
Conversely, free entry into the South by Northern employers could have bid up 
the wages for labor above the rates that Southern employers acting in concert 
(and backed by the force of the state), the Ku Klux Klan, and a host of informal 
groups and gangs could have set. The basic insight is that a competitive market 
will work well in both directions because the fortunes of an oppressed group 
under open market conditions depend only on the attitudes of those who are 
most favorably disposed to it. The opinions of others groups do not matter since 
they are no longer in the hiring market. The conditions are very different when 
either private violence or political power sets wages and other employment 
terms. With the former, it is the least favorably disposed group that can deter-
mine the terms of trade. With the latter it is, roughly speaking, the median  
voter.  
These avenues of political control were effectively exploited in the South 
prior to 1964. I wrote a short account of these laws in my 1994 article Standing 
Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, which answered my many critics as follows: 
The Emigrant-Agent Laws imposed heavy taxes on those agents who sought 
to encourage black labor to leave the South for more gainful employment 
elsewhere. If there were no market pressures operating for the exit, then pre-
sumably these statutes would have been unnecessary. As it was, they were un-
able to stem the flow of migrant labor from the South, but not for want of try-
ing. Vagrancy laws were used as a means for forcing blacks to enter into labor 
contracts in the first place, by attacking so-called idleness, and contract-
enforcement laws in Mississippi “required Negroes to enter into labor con-
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tracts by a specific day each January,” and laws in other Southern states re-
quired employers to grant discharge to their black laborers before they could 
be hired by other employers.35 
The standard blackboard account of markets does not delve into the opera-
tion of these rules but assumes, if only implicitly, that public institutions are 
well ordered. In this context, “well ordered” means that these institutions en-
force the background norms of tort and criminal law so as to prevent various 
forms of private aggression against all citizens within the state, all of whom 
have, of course, full rights of access to the political system to help choose the 
people who will enact and enforce the laws. It also assumes that the major 
agencies of the state distribute the essential services such as gas, electricity, and 
telephone service on equal terms to all citizens. It further assumes that state 
public institutions will not turn a blind eye to private acts of violence that are 
intended to prevent other individuals from exercising their normal rights of as-
sociation in the marketplace. The dysfunctional nature of Southern labor mar-
kets needs no further elaboration. No one can claim that this system of South-
ern governance was “well ordered.” 
The stress on aberrant social institutions is not in evidence in the contribu-
tion of Samuel Bagenstos to this Symposium. Instead, his defense of Title II 
depends on his “postrealist” views of private property when he writes: 
In a postrealist world, we understand that regulation is not incompatible with 
private ownership. Laws delimiting the rights and obligations of property 
owners and those with whom they deal do not, in Paul’s phrasing, make the 
government the owner of the property. Indeed, the institutions of property and 
contract depend on background legal rules delimiting those rights and obliga-
tions and enforcing them in cases of breach.36  
The inspiration for this passage was Rand Paul’s objection to Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act on pure freedom of association grounds. At the time of Paul’s 
statements,37 and since then,38 I have taken Senator Paul to task on exactly the 
 
 35. Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1, 42-43 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (quoting William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in 
the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31 (1976), reprinted in 
AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 317, 322 
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., enlarged ed. 1988)). 
 36. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accom-
modations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1222 (2014). 
 37. Richard A. Epstein, Rand Paul’s Wrong Answer, FORBES (May 24, 2010, 
12:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/24/rand-paul-rachel-maddow-opinions-column 
ists-richard-a-epstein.html.  
 38. Richard A. Epstein, My Rand Paul Problem: Why Classical Liberalism Is Superior 
to Hard-Core Libertarianism, DEFINING IDEAS (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.hoover.org/ 
publications/defining-ideas/article/167496. It turns out that Senator Paul does not categori-
cally oppose the income tax, which on that issue at least means that he is not a hard-core lib-
ertarian, although his proposal is far less progressive than the current law. See Richard Ep-
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two points that are in issue here—the economic structure of common carriers 
and the deplorable institutional arrangements in the United States at the time of 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Bagenstos points out that property and con-
tract depend on legal rules for their articulation and enforcement, but the con-
ventional rules of property and contract promote the protection of individual 
zones of autonomy and the security of exchange, both of which were utterly ab-
sent in the South. Unfortunately, civil rights laws displace these beneficial 
common law institutions with a set of rules on forced exchange in cases where 
monopoly issues don’t apply. The objection to these rules is that they lead to 
negative-sum games, not that they regulate property. The thought that forced-
association laws “may serve broader interests in democracy, freedom, and the 
operation of a system in which individuals have an opportunity to acquire and 
exchange property”39 is whistling in the dark. Market competition poses no 
threat to democratic institutions. But partisan struggles over forced associations 
do.  
Civil rights laws grounded in the problem of monopoly power supply a far 
firmer basis for economic and political stability alike than the misinformed 
postrealist critique.40 Far from any universal structural defect in competitive 
markets, these background considerations of institutionalized segregation make 
it painfully clear that competitive markets in the standard sense are not easily 
maintained or supported. Start with a voting system that is wholly skewed to 
members of one race who bear extensive levels of animus to individuals of an-
other race. Any allusion to the system of equal justice before the law is an illu-
sion in the face of systematic political domination. The reason why Justice John 
Marshall Harlan mounted so powerful an appeal to the norm of “color-blind” 
justice in Plessy v. Ferguson is that this elementary principle had been violated 
in connection with the imposition upon carriers and customers alike of the re-
quirement that black and white passengers be carried in separate railroad cars, 
or at least in separate sections of the same car.41 The imposition of 
antimiscegenation laws is a violent affront to the ordinary principles of freedom 
 
stein, Re: My Rand Paul Problem, RICOCHET.COM (Feb. 11, 2014, 8:57 AM), 
http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Re-My-Rand-Paul-Problem. 
 39. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1222. 
 40. For one defense of this proposition, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES 
REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 84-111 (2006) (explaining the damage that cartelization has 
imposed on labor and agricultural markets). To see how rate regulation done right can ad-
dress the monopoly problem, see Epstein, supra note 28, at 345-46. 
 41. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens 
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards 
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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of association, which apply as much (if not more) to marriage as to any other 
relationship. The simple point here is that the exercise of state power was ex-
erted in a race-conscious fashion that blocked rights of free association of all 
citizens white and black. 
Unfortunately, the dangerous consequences of Plessy are often obscured by 
extensive discussions of the then-fashionable tripartite distinction between civ-
il, social, and political rights to which Bagenstos devotes much of his Essay. He 
quotes Mark Tushnet for the basic distinction as follows: “The core civil rights 
included the rights to sue and testify; social rights included the right to select 
one’s associates; voting was the central political right.”42 As an analytical mat-
ter, the civil-social distinction is not quite right because it has nothing to do 
with the line between legal and social obligations. The more accurate line 
seems to be that in this context, civil rights refers to rights that deal with the en-
forcement of claims within the legal system, and social rights with the ability to 
exercise rights of free association that people can enjoy without having to go to 
court to enforce them. But the distinction is said to gain traction because of the 
use to which Justice Brown put it in Plessy:  
 The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not 
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce so-
cial, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two rac-
es upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, 
their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do 
not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been 
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state 
legislatures in the exercise of their police power.43 
Yet this passage makes a mockery of the notion of freedom of association 
implicit in the notion of social rights when it equates law “permitting, and even 
requiring” these interactions. Laws permitting the freedom of association, at 
least outside the common carrier situation, are consistent with the libertarian 
framework, and in the South their most important application would have been 
to protect blacks and whites who sought to associate together from state sanc-
tion or private abuse. But, as Bagenstos notes, the true crime of Plessy is that it 
“required race segregation in public conveyances and in schools,”44 a pro-
foundly anti-libertarian conception. The distinction between civil and social 
rights is a sideshow. The key notion is that, properly qualified by common car-
 
 42. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1210 (quoting Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality 
in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton 
Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 886 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 43. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. 
 44. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1212. 
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rier rules, the principle of freedom of association is fully protected by the 
common law rules of property and contract.  
It remains therefore critical to note the threats to the social rights of all in-
dividuals posed by segregation. Southern states systemically augmented their 
powers by how local officials ran their local governments, especially in their 
control over various common carriers and public utilities. Governments exer-
cise power over the ability of businesses and residences to access roads, elec-
tricity, gas, and water. In each of these cases, governments have control over 
the kinds of institutions with monopoly power that are properly subject to gen-
eral regulation. But the regulation that is required offers open and equal access 
to all persons. It is not a system that allows for political actors to deny service 
covertly to those private firms that do not toe the segregationist line. One rea-
son why the Southern system remained as tight as it did was that most local 
businesses supported the status quo ante and thus had nothing to fear if they 
implemented segregationist policies. But at the same time, new businesses, es-
pecially from the North, that might have been tempted to enter the local market 
to take advantage of depressed black wages were well advised to stay out lest 
local government intrigue cut their key services at the most inopportune time. 
Of course, the local utility could apologize profusely when service was disrupt-
ed or curtailed, but what remedy lies when the legal system is itself dominated 
by champions of segregation? 
The disruption of public services was in turn supplemented by the use and 
threat of private violence against those who tried to stand up to the dominant 
political forces. A friendly gesture by a white person to a black friend could 
lead to dangerous consequences. As youngsters in the North in the 1950s, with 
no direct connection to the South, we knew well that so simple an act as pur-
chasing gas from a black-owned filling station could lead to a beating or worse.  
At this point, it is only necessary to put together the pieces. The practice of 
freedom of association cannot survive in a society that has corrupt electoral in-
stitutions, corrupt provision of public services, corrupt use of public force, and 
unrestrained use of private violence. The hard question in these settings is to 
ask exactly what legal changes should be made. In one sense, the thought that 
some nondiscrimination principle could gain hold through legislation seems 
laughable. Indeed, it was only because federal legislation could work, with 
much huffing and puffing, to override state legislation that the local monopoly 
was broken. In this regard, it is worth noting that the 1962 decision in Baker v. 
Carr provides powerful evidence of the tenacity of those who held undue pow-
er to insulate themselves from institutional reform.45 The party that controls the 
local franchise can continue to redirect power and resources to its favored con-
 
 45. 369 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1962) (detailing how the 1901 apportionment formula re-
mained in place for sixty years notwithstanding huge population shifts). 
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stituency. It was only by going outside the system that the legislative solution 
had a chance. 
There were three possible lines of attack against these entrenched segrega-
tionist institutions. The first of these was the use of private rights of action and 
public prosecution against those who used force. In speaking of the remedial 
issues, Bagenstos asks: “Even as of 1964, if the problem was a cartel that en-
forced discrimination by businesses via threats, violence, and harassment, why 
is the proper libertarian response not to directly target the threats, violence, har-
assment, and monopoly, so that business owners will be truly free to choose 
whom to serve?”46 No one should claim that these direct actions should be pre-
cluded. The harder question is whether they should be regarded as sufficient, as 
his question seems to imply. Bagenstos’s way of setting up the problem fails to 
grasp the difficult remedial choices of under- and overenforcement. Private 
rights of action against a variety of individual persons are hard to enforce, es-
pecially in a system where the levers of power are in the hands of the champi-
ons of segregation who approve of the current arrangement. The matter there-
fore required federal intervention, which worked much better than any form of 
case-by-case remedy through the tort system. To be sure, there may be some 
overbreadth in relying on federal intervention, but the rapid extent to which the 
major retailers and restaurants fell into line showed that the broader response 
was the best option. It is only a hard-line libertarian who would rely solely on 
ex post damage actions or criminal sanctions in the individual case. The classi-
cal liberal approach is far more flexible on the choice of remedies. 
At this juncture only two lines of attack remained, and there was no reason 
not to use both of them. The first of these was to go after embedded sources of 
political power. The second was to prevent its most vicious manifestations. On 
the first point, it was manifestly the right decision to start the attack on segrega-
tion through a reform of the electoral system. At the time that Title I was 
passed, nothing fancy was intended or needed. The explicit exclusion by race 
was a staple of Southern artifice, and it did not matter whether it was done 
overtly or stealthily. The practices had to stop. In dealing with these remedial 
choices, the challenge is always to thread the needle between remedies that are 
too tough and those that are not tough enough. This issue of remedial design is 
important for answering the question, for example, of whether to have special 
preclearance rights in Title I of the Civil Rights Act.47 Interestingly enough, the 
preclearance procedures of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,48 have no analog in 
 
 46. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1226-27. 
 47. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. I, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 241-42 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012)). 
 48. Pub. L. 89-110, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973b-1973c), invalidated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). The con-
troversies here continue with the recent Supreme Court decision in Shelby County. 
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the context of public accommodations. Instead, the major issues of 
overenforcement in the public accommodations context relate only to the 
choice between public and private enforcement or some combination thereof. 
Yet it would be a mistake to think that it was sufficient to prevent long-
term abuse without tackling the short-term problem of the systematic denial of 
service in many places in the Deep South and elsewhere. The key point here is 
to note that many of the strongest supporters of Title II were the large firms that 
would be regulated by it. It is not that these firms thought it was good in itself 
to surrender power to the federal government. Rather, it was their clear percep-
tion that only federal intervention could hold at bay those local officials and lo-
cal citizens that could be expected to shut down their operations by hook or 
crook if the firms tried to integrate their facilities. Viewed in this light, the 
dominant motive for the passage of Title II came from parties whose basic 
commercial interests were undermined by segregation and who wanted gov-
ernment protection at the federal level against the depredations by public and 
private forces at the local level.49 Thus just as the railroads did not want to be 
subject to state segregation laws in the 1890s, so in the 1960s, the next genera-
tion of businesses wanted to be out from under the thumb of those dangerous 
and reactionary elements who prevented them from integrating their facilities, 
which they desperately wanted to do.  
Viewed from this perspective, the question with respect to Title II was 
whether it went too far or did not go far enough. Even those who thought that 
Ollie’s Barbecue had in principle the perfect and absolute right to turn away 
customers on account of race had to recognize that the first order of business 
was to make sure that those firms that wanted to integrate could not be blocked 
from doing so by state officials and private violence.50 In this respect, the de-
fense of Title II at the time of its enactment was on decidedly second-best 
grounds: a statute that is not needed in a perfect world is much needed in an 
imperfect one. The weight of history makes it impossible to leap from state-
imposed segregation to a perfectly voluntary market. In light of the past, it was 
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 50. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (rejecting Commerce 
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better to move too fast rather than to go too slow. No one today need reject the 
judgment that was made some fifty years ago. 
The situation on the ground in 1964 therefore called for extensive measures 
to undo a broken and corrupt system. But remember that none of those violent 
episodes around the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did an-
ything to undermine the basic relationships that as a matter of first principles 
should govern a society with sound public institutions, including properly 
elected public officials, a disinterested police force, a professional public ad-
ministration, and strict control over private violence. The politics that sur-
rounded Title II of the Civil Rights Act did not clearly distinguish between the 
first- and second-best rationales for its implementation, for at the time there 
was no pressing need to do so. But times change, and background conditions 
can change with them. On each of the key measures—voting, public admin-
istration, policing, and private violence—the abuses were largely eliminated, in 
large part due to some of the extraordinary measures imposed in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil Rights Act.  
The major transformations over the past fifty years should spark a norma-
tive reexamination of the scope and impact of Title II. In this regard, it is useful 
to set the two rationales for the application of Title II against the various insti-
tutions that are covered by it. The best practical argument for Title II was that it 
functioned as a corrective against private force and public abuse in government. 
The best theoretical argument for Title II was that an antidiscrimination rule 
was needed to offset institutions that wielded monopoly power. In principle, 
that rationale is as good today as the day it was uttered. But the economic land-
scape has changed in ways that have eroded the strength of traditional monopo-
lies, at least those not backed by government force. One feature of advanced 
technology is that it reduces the number of firms and industries that hold mo-
nopoly power. In the Middle Ages, the one inn on the road from London to Ox-
ford held a monopoly position. But today the view that any hotel, motel, or inn 
possesses monopoly power is odd in an age when customers typically move by 
car, plane, or bus, with lots of choices of where to spend the night. The eating 
establishments listed with such precision in Title II51 also operate in a competi-
tive industry, which is surely the case with the movie theaters, concert halls, 
and arenas that are found everywhere. The original justifications for civil rights 
enforcement have become weaker. Yet ironically, the scope of the law has be-
come ever more extensive. 
III. THE EXPANSION OF TITLE II AND KINDRED STATUTES  
With the adoption of Title II, it is important to see how its statutory defini-
tion of a public accommodation squares up with the traditional account of a 
 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). 
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common carrier. The expansive nature of Title II’s definition becomes clearer 
when its scope is contrasted with the smaller class of businesses that were cov-
ered under Hale’s “affected with a publick interest” test before that test’s de-
mise in Nebbia v. New York in 1934.52 To keep Nebbia in perspective, it is crit-
ical to contrast it with Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 
decided in 1923.53 Under the conventional wisdom of the day, the classification 
of a business as one affected with a public interest was thought to give the state 
the power to regulate its rates so long as those rates were not confiscatory. The 
precise holding in Wolff was that a small packing house in Kansas, whose wag-
es a state statute sought to regulate, was not “affected with a public interest” 
because it fell into none of the traditional regulated categories.54 The first two 
categories involved the traditional common carriers and inns. But all the action 
in this case took place with respect to a third category:  
Businesses which though not public at their inception may be fairly said to 
have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to some gov-
ernment regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the 
public that this is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the 
owner by devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an 
interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of 
that interest although the property continues to belong to its private owner and 
to be entitled to protection accordingly.55 
After offering that definition, Chief Justice Taft, writing for a unanimous 
Court, listed cases illustrating the types of concerns that were covered.56 These 
started with grain elevators, which were thought to have a “‘virtual’ monopoly” 
in Munn v. Illinois,57 a case that played a key historical role by transforming 
Allnutt v. Inglis into a principle of American constitutional law.58 The list also 
 
 52. 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934) (“[T]here is no closed class or category of businesses 
affected with a public interest . . . . So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, . . . 
a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote 
public welfare . . . .”). 
 53. 262 U.S. 522 (1923), abrogated by Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502.  
 54. See id. at 543 (describing the packing house); id. at 533 (describing the state stat-
ute); id. at 535 (listing the traditional regulated categories); id. at 539, 544 (suggesting that 
the packing house probably does not fit into any of those categories). 
 55. Id. at 535. 
 56. Id. at 535-36. 
 57. 94 U.S. 113, 131 (1877); see also Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 
391, 399-405 (1894) (applying Munn and Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892), to uphold 
North Dakota’s regulation of grain elevators); Budd, 143 U.S. at 543 (explicitly reaffirming 
Munn and upholding New York’s regulation of grain elevators); Spring Valley Water Works 
v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 354 (1884) (citing Munn for the proposition that local govern-
ments may regulate “one who enjoys a virtual monopoly”).  
 58. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 151-52 (citing Allnutt v. Inglis, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 206 
(K.B.) 210-11; 12 East 527, 538-40) (“From this case it appears that it is only where some 
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included cases affirming state regulation of matters such as water companies59 
(which should in any event be lumped with public utilities), banks subject to 
customer runs,60 more controversially, large insurance companies doing busi-
ness in a competitive market,61 and rent-controlled housing units, but only in 
times of emergency.62 Thus, Chief Justice Taft’s definition was much narrower 
than the one that was eventually adopted in Title II. 
In light of the argument developed in Part II of this Essay, the key question 
then arises whether the peculiar constellation of political and legal forces pre-
vents free entry into particular geographical markets. Racially motivated zoning 
laws may have those effects. But ordinarily, population mobility counteracts 
any nascent form of monopoly power in ordinary business establishments. The 
number of business choices is very high so that the case for Title II becomes 
quite thin over many areas of its operation. Nor can it be said that a strong set 
of formal and informal sanctions makes it impossible for any particular firm to 
serve members of minority groups. We are long past the days when Robert Jo-
seph Pershing Foster could not find accommodations in Arizona for the night 
out of fear of what others might do.63  
The competitive market works well when supported by well-ordered public 
institutions, whose formation undercuts the case for retaining Title II. But in the 
area of its original application there is no need whatsoever to take on that hero-
ic battle. Within the class of institutions originally targeted by Title II in 1964, 
its effect has caused no visible inconvenience. Some of these public accommo-
dations remain common carriers, at least for some fraction of their markets, as 
with certain airline and railroad routes. But even those institutions that have no 
or weak monopoly power still resemble common carriers in certain key ways. 
Look at the way in which admission to a movie theater or amusement park is 
 
privilege in the bestowal of the government is enjoyed in connection with the property, that 
it is affected with a public interest in any proper sense of the terms.”). 
 59. See Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1917). 
 60. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 113, amended by 219 U.S. 575 
(1911). 
 61. See Ger. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 411-15 (1914). I regard this 
case as wrong on rates because of competition, but proper on security of premiums given the 
risk of default.  
 62. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921). Chief Justice Taft joined the dissent 
in this five-to-four decision, see id. at 158 (McKenna, J., dissenting), which was thought to 
rest on short-term emergencies but has become massively abused under New York stabiliza-
tion laws, in which the emergency comes like clockwork every three years. The current law 
calls for the end of control only when the vacancy rate reaches five percent in any category. 
See Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8623 (McKinney 
2014). The provision was last reenacted in 2011, extending the law for another four years. 
Rent Act of 2011, ch. 97, § 1-a, 2011 N.Y. Laws 767, 767 (codified as amended at 
UNCONSOL. § 8623). 
 63. See WILKERSON, supra note 3, at 206-10. 
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determined: it is strictly and solely by the ability to pay, subject to certain limi-
tations on age (for admission) and sex (for washrooms). Even though these in-
stitutions are not common carriers, their proprietors have no interest in review-
ing customer resumes before selling tickets to the latest show. Quite simply, it 
is in their interest to take all comers on the same terms just as common carriers 
have traditionally done. Loutish or menacing behavior can still result in ejec-
tion with cause, so that these operations proceed more or less without a hitch. 
Why repeal a benign statute in order to raise symbolic hackles? The contrast 
between the common applications of Title II and the intrusive and mischievous 
preclearance procedures under sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act could 
not be more vivid.  
The potential application of Title II is fraught with far greater risk, howev-
er, when enforcement challenges organizations that do not operate lunch coun-
ters and movie theaters, for in these cases rival interests come into play. That 
principle was recognized in the run-up to Title II in connection with one hard-
fought exemption from Title II: an exception for “an establishment located 
within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and 
which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his resi-
dence.”64 Each of these specific conditions was the result of a hard-fought 
compromise over the status of Mrs. Murphy’s much-debated boarding house. 
To get the pulse of the times, read this uneasy account of the struggle from the 
vantage point of the passionate defender of Title II: 
 Already there was grave concern over the wide-spread newspaper talk that 
the public accommodations section would be gutted, possibly by an exemption 
for “small” public accommodations. “Mrs. Murphy’s boarding house” with a 
few rooms was one thing, for her right of privacy cut across the [black per-
son’s] right to a room. But a general exception for all small public accommo-
dations was something else again. A [black] laborer entering a small diner 
could be quite as hungry as a [black] banker seeking service at the Waldorf 
[Hotel in New York].65 
The scope of that concession was limited to situations where people were 
justly concerned about their privacy and safety when asked to live and work in 
close proximity with each other. People do check references before accepting 
boarders. The point of this exception under Title II was to carve out the cases 
where personal preferences matter most, while leaving subject to the law the 
large inn or hotel, where the impersonal nature of the business makes for few of 
 
 64. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, § 201(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012). 
 65. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Role of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in the 
Civil Rights Struggle of 1963-1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE 
LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 49, 55 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (alterations in 
original). 
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these close interactions. Basically, the deal worked, and the exception has had 
no significant role to play. 
The same type of concern was also raised with respect to “a private club or 
other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the 
facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons 
of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) [which defines the insti-
tutions covered by Title II].”66 Clubs are different beasts because they all have 
distinct organizational objectives, membership rules, and complex internal gov-
ernance structures. These organizations never relate to their members in the 
same way that hotels, restaurants, and movie theaters relate to their customers. 
In clubs and other voluntary organizations, people care a lot about whom they 
associate with. The type of open seating that works on airplanes won’t work in 
organizations that choose to assign seats at their annual banquet. No defender 
of the nondiscrimination provision believes that all these organizations should, 
or could, run on the same principles as the traditional business.  
The original application of public accommodations laws to common carri-
ers, narrowly defined, covers those cases where claims for associational prefer-
ences are at their weakest. At that point, the social losses, if any, created by im-
posing a nondiscrimination norm hardly seem to be of any concern, given the 
smooth implementation of the program once the restrictions were in fact put 
into place. Indeed, it is hard to tell whether Title II protected the preferences of 
individuals who opposed segregation but were afraid to speak out, whether it 
added legitimacy to the nondiscrimination principle, or whether it just matched 
the change in public sentiments reflected by the widespread and growing politi-
cal support for the statute itself.  
The next question is how the broad reach of the new antidiscrimination 
principle plays out in other cases that are covered by a very broad definition of 
what counts as a public accommodation. Take the example of private clubs, or-
ganizations which are generally open only to members, which means that 
someone has to take the time to decide who is in and who is out. The member-
ship process itself gives firm evidence that people care more about who is a 
member of their club or church than they do about the identity of the person 
next to them in the checkout line. Put otherwise, the question is whether these 
private institutions should be treated like the common carriers of old when the 
arguments of freedom of association that cut against the characterization grow 
far stronger. Not only is there a complete absence of monopoly power, but 
there is also a concern with internal operations that just does not arise in the 
earlier civil rights cases. Nonetheless, the next generation of antidiscrimination 
cases ignored these critical differences.  
 
 66. § 201(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). 
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IV. FROM PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS  
A. Jaycees and Boy Scouts  
The first of the new wave of cases was the 1984 decision in Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, which involved a decision by the Commissioner of the 
Minnesota Department of Human Rights to strike down the Jaycees’ decision 
to limit itself to male members only.67 The moniker “human rights” shows how 
far the law has moved from the original concern of the nondiscrimination rule 
for common carriers developed at common law. Under the new definition, hu-
man rights do not include rights of property and free association, but impose an 
obligation not to discriminate against outsiders in certain businesses or accom-
modations68—including retail stores,69 which are not explicitly covered by Ti-
tle II.70 In his Essay, Bagenstos claims, “As Joseph Singer has shown exten-
sively, the common law doctrine before the Civil War in many jurisdictions at 
least plausibly prohibited any discrimination by any business holding itself out 
as serving the public.”71 Bagenstos, however, provides no citation to a particu-
lar passage that supports that conclusion, which Singer tentatively defends on a 
mix of normative and historical grounds that in the end are not sufficient to dis-
place the common view to the contrary.72 It is also unclear what it means under 
 
 67. 468 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1984). 
 68. The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue in Roberts, for example, imposed an 
obligation not “[t]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation 
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex.” Id. at 615 (quoting 
MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Minnesota’s statute applied (and continues to apply) to every “business, accom-
modation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind.” Id. 
(quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.01(18)); accord MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(34) (2013) (retaining 
that same language). 
 70. See Singer, supra note 16, at 1288-93. 
 71. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1225.  
 72. Singer writes: 
Businesses other than inns and carriers dealt in necessities such as salt, food, materials to 
make clothes, and services such as medical care. Denial of such goods and services would 
have caused great hardship precisely because there was often no more than one general store 
or doctor in the area, thereby constituting as much of an effective monopoly as the inn or 
stagecoach. In addition, many businesses other than inns and common carriers were required 
to obtain licenses or franchises from the state in order to operate. 
Singer, supra note 16, at 1292-93. But even if there were no close substitutes, the services in 
question were not of the standardized variety.  
It is exceedingly doubtful that the physician was treated as a common carrier. See, e.g., 
Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (“In obtaining the state’s license 
(permission) to practice medicine, the state does not require, and the licensee does not en-
gage, that he will practice at all or on other terms than he may choose to accept. Counsel’s 
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this common formulation for any business to “hold[] itself out as serving the 
public.” The standard rule on common carriers prohibited them from making 
any contrary public reference. But as to ordinary retail shops, if they posted a 
sign regarding whom they refused to serve, that action itself might well have 
removed them from the class of public accommodations. 
But the legal relevance of this diversion is uncertain. Even though it is 
crystal clear that the Minnesota Human Rights Act covers retail establishments, 
the fit between the Jaycees and the statute still looks less than ideal, given the 
objectives of the Jaycees to “foster the growth and development of young 
men’s civic organization in the United States.”73 The Jaycees also entertained a 
variety of similar objectives, which surely qualify it for treatment as a tax-
exempt organization under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
applies to “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.”74  
Notwithstanding the Jaycees’ extensive social program, the Commissioner 
took the position that the Jaycees was covered by the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act.75 The Jaycees then mounted its constitutional challenge against the Act in 
federal court, which in turn certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. The state supreme court held that the Jaycees was covered by the statute 
because the Jaycees organization 
(a) is a “business” in that it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange for 
annual membership dues; (b) is a “public” business in that it solicits and re-
cruits dues-paying members based on unselective criteria; and (c) is a public 
business “facility” in that it conducts its activities at fixed and mobile sites 
within the State of Minnesota.76 
The manifest differences between organizations like the Jaycees, with their 
substantive programs, and the standard movie theater is too evident to require 
any serious discussion, for these organizations are not just open to the public 
upon payment of a fee. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice 
Brennan was alert to the serious issues raised, but he nonetheless overruled the 
Eighth Circuit, which had struck down the statute,77 by holding that the Jaycees 
fell on the public accommodations side of the line. In Justice Brennan’s view, 
the only escape from that classification involved intimate associations on the 
ground that only family relations give rise to “deep attachments and commit-
 
analogies, drawn from the obligations to the public on the part of innkeepers, common carri-
ers, and the like, are beside the mark.”). Hurley is not cited in Singer’s article. 
 73. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612 (quoting the Jaycees’ bylaws).  
 74. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012). 
 75. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615. 
 76. Id. at 616 (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768-74 (Minn. 
1981)). 
 77. See U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 468 U.S. 
609. 
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ments” that require a “high degree of selectivity” and “seclusion” and thus mer-
it legal protection.78 He concluded:  
As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely 
to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of 
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty. Conversely, an associa-
tion lacking these qualities—such as a large business enterprise—seems re-
mote from the concerns giving rise to this constitutional protection.79 
 Yet why? No one quarrels with the view that intimate personal associations 
should not be subject to any antidiscrimination norm. Could it really be a crim-
inal offense to deliberately refuse to marry a person because of his or her reli-
gion or national origin? But nothing that Justice Brennan wrote addressed ei-
ther of two key questions about the extension of that principle beyond these 
core cases. Thus he did not explain why this law should go beyond the standard 
definition of public accommodations to ordinary businesses that operate in 
competitive environments. Nor did he explain why the law, if it does go beyond 
those businesses, should extend to organizations like the Jaycees. In dealing 
with both questions, the relationship of employer to employee, and of employ-
ees to each other, is worlds apart from the standard firm-to-customer relation-
ship. It is for just this reason that the provisions regulating discrimination in 
employment are, to say the least, far more difficult to apply than those set out 
in Title II.  
As a working generalization with many exceptions, civic leagues like the 
Jaycees have to govern relationships of large numbers of individuals with wide 
variations in tastes and sentiments. Any decision to let the state force an associ-
ation of one person or group on an organization necessarily has serious nega-
tive consequences for the persons within the organization who lose some con-
trol over their organization when subjected to this state imposition. The range 
of sentiments and tastes is vastly expanded by the change in membership, 
which makes it harder to reach consensus on matters of common concern. The 
original members, who may have given years of service to their organization, 
are thus left with the choice between running an operation in ways that com-
promise their principles, leaving the organization, or shutting it down al-
together.  
Yet the need to permit one group to break down the doors of another insti-
tution cannot be justified on the ground that they have no place else to go. 
There are no transactional barriers to letting the new members in, and just that 
change in membership policy would happen if in fact the change in composi-
tion were a win-win situation for the outside applicants and the current mem-
bers. The fact that this transformation does not happen across the board is evi-
dence that the Minnesota Human Rights Act imposes win-lose types of deals, 
 
 78. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. 
 79. Id. at 620. 
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which are always harder to maintain given that one side is always intent on al-
tering the deal in order to improve its terms of trade. The results are not unique 
to these so-called public accommodations, but also extend to any organization 
where the mandate is imposed on the one side for the benefit of the other. This 
happens, for example, when employers have to deal with unions on a good faith 
basis, even when the union has (as the exclusive representative of the work-
ers80) monopoly power over the firm, including the power to abrogate preexist-
ing contracts with workers.81 A similar result happens under rent-control stat-
utes that require landlords to renew their leases against their will with terms 
that promise them far less by way of rent than a market rate. Indeed, we should 
expect nothing less than this kind of antisocial behavior. The party subject to 
the imposition is right to protest the use of force directed its way, so that it will 
use every means within the law (and, regrettably, some beyond it) to rid itself 
of a losing contract, either by breaking off the relationship or changing its terms 
of trade. It is for this reason that ordinary contracts at will, which are termina-
ble at any time by either side, routinely have great durability. A set of constant 
incremental adjustments allows both sides to share in the gains, which reduces 
the desire of either side to defect from the agreement.82 Of course these con-
tracts often do dissolve as one party finds that it no longer wants to deal with 
the other. But these are clean breaks that are not marked by prolonged struggle 
involving strikes, lockouts, and other refusals to deal, which are routine in labor 
law cases.83 Quite simply, external force by the state is always necessary to 
keep win-lose arrangements from blowing apart, which introduces new levels 
of social uncertainty and new layers of administrative oversight. 
The question is whether there is reason to incur these long-term destabili-
zation costs. Letting one organization exclude potential members does not pre-
vent outsiders from joining or forming countless organizations that do not use 
sex or race or any similar criterion for admission. Indeed, it was surely the case 
that many members of the Jaycees in 1984 were also members of organizations 
that admitted women as full and equal members. There were in all likelihood 
many women’s organizations that did not admit men on equal terms. It is no 
credit to the United States to limit by legislation the diversity and types of or-
ganizations that can be formed for all sorts of nonbusiness reasons to those 
 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). 
 81. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (imposing a collective bar-
gaining agreement on dissenting employees by abrogating preexisting contracts). 
 82. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 947 (1984). 
 83. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 237-
38 (1970) (enforcing a no-strike clause by injunction, notwithstanding the anti-injunction 
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 301-
02, 318 (1965) (allowing an employer to “lock[] out” his employees during a labor dispute in 
order to bring economic pressure in support of his bargaining position). 
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groups which meet the approval of the Minnesota Commissioner of Human 
Rights, who shows scant respect for the rights of individuals to form their own 
organizations as judged by their own rules and standards.  
Consistent with this view, it would be a deep mistake to require any large 
all-women association to admit men. Philosophically, it could well be more 
dangerous to decide that such organizations were entitled to a pass from the 
general antidiscrimination law because of the legacy of discrimination against 
women, which is then viewed as creating a historic debt that can never be paid 
off. The world is a better and more confident place if voluntary organizations 
can choose their own admission requirements and change them in accordance 
with the wishes of their membership. Indeed, in a world of free association, no 
organization is exempt from changing social pressures, and each must adjust its 
membership provisions to take into account that social risk. At a guess, all-men 
organizations pay a higher social price for exclusion than comparable groups 
for women. The members and boards of such organizations have to think long 
and hard before they decide to reduce the potential membership base of their 
organizations. And should they make the decision to preserve their exclusive 
membership lists, the only persons who should be in a position to challenge that 
decision are their own members, in accordance with their internal rules. In a 
heavily competitive environment, the fact that some group is able to become 
and stay large only means that it has adopted a successful formula for govern-
ing its internal affairs. Its success does not mean that it has to forfeit control 
over the policies that have guided it to date. 
The decision to treat the Jaycees as a business was made in large part be-
cause Justice Brennan had his eye on the status of large business operations that 
are right now subject to extensive antidiscrimination norms. Justice Brennan 
was well aware that the principle of freedom of association finds no place un-
der either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the collective bargaining 
procedures outlined under the National Labor Relations Act.84 There is no mo-
nopoly justification for either of these flat restrictions on the principle of free-
dom of association;85 nor is there any easy way to administer the appropriate 
good faith standards of negotiation. There are of course vast differences in how 
the two statutes operate, and each therefore can be subjected to forms of specif-
 
 84. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169). 
 85. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1915) (striking down a state law 
that required employers to engage in mandatory collective bargaining with unions); Adair v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protects the 
right to enter or refuse to enter into contracts). For my defense of these decisions, see Rich-
ard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Leg-
islation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1370-75 (1983). 
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ic criticisms that could not be lodged against the other.86 The Civil Rights Act 
often relies on disparate impact theories that have high error rates in determin-
ing improper motive. The National Labor Relations Act often provides insuffi-
cient protection for dissenting members of the bargaining unit.87 
Yet it is a mistake in a discussion of this sort to concentrate on these differ-
ences. What matters is the common mistakes that make both of these regimes a 
threat to individual liberty and a massive drain on the productive capacities of 
the residents of United States, who are duty-bound to enforce laws that make 
their businesses less responsive to the needs of their shareholders, customers, 
suppliers, and, all too often, their present and prospective employees.88  
In grappling with these thorny issues, it is clear that the dim voice of Rob-
ert Bork did not echo in the ears of Justice Brennan, who at no point sought to 
apply any general test of social welfare to see if the changes wrought by the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act counted as a social improvement under either the 
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks tests for social welfare.89 At this juncture, moreover, it 
does not matter which of these two tests is chosen, because rules like the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act generate a large set of social losses through the de-
stabilization of competitive markets with administrative systems that are more 
costly, less efficient, and more vulnerable to political intrigue than the ordinary 
firms that they displace. Nor is it sufficient to say that these laws produce some 
unquantifiable positive externalities for third persons in society at large, since 
the laws displace common law rules which produce even greater benefits by 
doing something that no system of government coercion can hope to accom-
plish: namely, increasing the opportunities for voluntary trade with all sorts of 
third persons. The rationale for freedom of association is not limited to intimate 
or small associations. It extends to every organization under the principle that 
mutual gain through cooperation is a principle that lies at the heart of a free so-
ciety. It should surely rank high on the list of human rights. 
The other cases in the Roberts line illustrate the same weaknesses of its tri-
partite classification of associations. In Board of Directors of Rotary Interna-
tional v. Rotary Club of Duarte,90 the Supreme Court upheld California’s Un-
 
 86. I have raised these specific criticisms in numerous places. See generally, e.g., 
EPSTEIN, supra note 1 (critiquing Title VII); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE 
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT (2009) (critiquing the National Labor Relations Act). 
 87. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (denying workers control over their 
own individual grievances). As a student, I criticized Vaca in Note, Individual Control over 
Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968). 
 88. The last qualification is needed because unions can only survive with the support 
of a majority of their workers, which leads them to adopt highly inefficient work rules, hurt-
ing some current employees and keeping out prospective employees. 
 89. For the standard definitions of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see, for exam-
ple, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17-20 (8th ed. 2011). 
 90. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
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ruh Civil Rights Act, which required Rotary Clubs to admit women, over 
claims based both on due process “freedom of private association” and on First 
Amendment “freedom of expressive association.”91 Similarly, in New York 
State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, the Supreme Court, speaking through 
Justice Byron White, rejected a federal constitutional challenge to New York 
City’s Human Rights Law, which prohibited discrimination based on race, 
creed, sex, and other grounds by any “place of public accommodation, resort or 
amusement,” but specifically exempted “any institution, club or place of ac-
commodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private.”92 That 
basic requirement was in turn subject to an exemption for certain clubs with 
fewer than four hundred members.93 In both of these post-Roberts cases the 
legislature based its human rights law on the state’s compelling state interest in 
eliminating discrimination by various clubs and other public accommodations 
in order to improve chances of equal opportunity for women and minorities.94 
Initially, it seems clear that the organizations at issue in New York State 
Club Ass’n could not credibly be described as “distinctly private” as that term 
is used in New York City’s Human Rights Law. But it hardly follows that this 
law can be justified by the threadbare efforts to identify the “compelling state 
interest” that justifies this limitation on associational freedom. There is of 
course no reason to think that all clubs and groups practice discrimination on 
grounds of sex or race so that some, indeed many, membership opportunities 
are available to all women and minority groups, who also have, and often exer-
cise, the option to form their own exclusive groups. The freedom of association 
pertains to these groups as well, so that there can be no claim of formal inequal-
ity across various lines of race and sex. Nor should the government ever take 
the position that under the First Amendment the only reason to exclude indi-
viduals is because they do not share the aims and ends of the organization, 
whatever those may be. It is exceedingly difficult for outsiders to understand 
the culture and ethos of private organizations, which may place great weight on 
the very traits that public accommodations laws regard as irrelevant. But the 
question still remains why any outsiders have the right to pass judgment on the 
membership rules and social behaviors of groups of which they are not a part.  
Of course, no group should be immune from criticism because of its poli-
cies of either admission or exclusion. But the threshold to engage in those ac-
tivities, always open to all, is far lower than the threshold that has to be crossed 
to engage in acts of state coercion that are in fact far more intrusive than the 
gathering of names that was rightly invalidated in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
 
 91. See id. at 544 & n.2, 545-47. 
 92. 487 U.S. 1, 4 & n.1, 5 (1988) (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(9), 
-107(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. Id. at 6 (quoting ADMIN. § 8-102(9)).  
 94. See id. at 5-6. 
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Patterson.95 In these cases, it is the wrong inquiry to ask whether the admission 
of new members will influence the public positions of particular bodies, which 
may or may not be the case. The key point is that any change in membership 
can lead to changes in the governance structures and internal norms that current 
members prize. The ultimate defense of freedom of association is that it does 
not require group members to justify their actions to legislatures who may not 
share in their beliefs. In most cases of compelling state interest one restricts 
speech for fear of imminent violence or systematic fraud. But it is dangerous 
business to assume that exclusion blocks the economic advancement of women 
and minorities or that open admission advances it. Like the Jaycees, the New 
York State Club Association and the Rotary Club advanced positions that prob-
ably lost internal support of group members shortly after they were announced. 
But far from justifying state coercion, that process of internal transformation of 
membership rules offers a reason why compulsory membership rules should 
not be imposed by government: there is no compelling state interest in chang-
ing norms that often change by voluntary means, especially when none of the 
clubs in question have anything close to the monopoly position that normally is 
needed to justify the application of an antidiscrimination norm. The effect of 
these laws is to reduce the richness and heterogeneity of our voluntary institu-
tions, without any assurance that the forced membership rules will have the 
slightest effect on the desired levels of economic integration and economic par-
ity—goals that have proved as elusive after the passage of these statutes as be-
fore. 
Given the way the law has developed, however, the logic of voluntary as-
sociation does not apply in any across-the-board fashion. Roberts and its prog-
eny have made it clear just how contingent freedom of association is on the 
predilections of judges. Nonetheless, that willingness to extend human rights 
laws to new situations has not foreclosed further development of the rules limit-
ing freedom of association. In Roberts, the Jaycees did not put much emphasis 
on the distinctive nature of its operation. Chances are it would have changed 
course quickly anyhow. It is harder to be confident about that judgment with 
Rotary Club of Duarte. But there are other larger organizations that have a 
stronger sense of mission, which does cut against the antidiscrimination law. 
That clash came to a head in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which asked 
whether the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination prohibited the Boy Scouts 
from excluding James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, on the grounds of his 
 
 95. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the First Amendment right of freedom of asso-
ciation prevented the state attorney general from forcing disclosure of the NAACP’s mem-
bership lists). 
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homosexual orientation.96 The relevant law is broad with respect to the organi-
zations that it wishes to cover when it provides in part: “All persons shall have 
the opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and 
privileges of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination 
because of . . . affectional or sexual orientation . . . .”97 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that the Boy Scouts were indeed covered by the statute even 
though, as an organization, they had no fixed place of operation.98  
A quick glance at the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion shows no 
qualms whatsoever about this state-law finding, so powerful in its mind was the 
antidiscrimination norm. But take the standard principles of freedom of asso-
ciation seriously, and the organization doesn’t look like a common carrier in 
light of its mission statement:  
 It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to 
instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make eth-
ical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential.  
 The values we strive to instill are based on those found in the Scout Oath 
and Law: 
Scout Oath  
On my honor I will do my best  
To do my duty to God and my country  
and to obey the Scout Law;  
To help other people at all times;  
To keep myself physically strong,  
mentally awake, and morally straight.  
  Scout Law 
A Scout is:  
Trustworthy Obedient  
Loyal  Cheerful  
Helpful  Thrifty  
Friendly  Brave  
Courteous  Clean  
Kind  Reverent.99 
 
 96. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). For an earlier statement of my views, see generally 
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000). 
 97. Id. app. at 661-62 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4). The language cited was in 
effect in 2000 when Dale was decided, and the language remains the same today. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2014). 
 98. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1210-11, 1230 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 
530 U.S. 640; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 646, 661 (construing and reversing the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s opinion). 
 99. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Boy Scouts’ 
mission statement). 
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Not many railroads could remain in business if their passengers all had to 
sign on to that program. Nor can one claim with a straight face that the Boy 
Scouts looks like an ordinary for-profit business. Nor is it possible to subscribe 
for a second to the odd property-based view that all that Dale sought from the 
Boy Scouts was some form of an “easement” to join their organization.100 An 
easement only allows entrance onto the property that would otherwise amount 
to a trespass. It permits, for example, individuals a right of way to walk or ride 
across the land of another without recrimination. But no easement has ever al-
lowed a party to participate in the operation or governance of a servient tene-
ment, which is exactly the claim that Dale made against the Boy Scouts.  
It is necessary to take a step back to see why the claim of freedom of asso-
ciation is strong here: just ask what would happen if whites in Alabama had 
claimed an “easement” to join the NAACP, which would have been a thousand 
times worse than the actions demanded in that case by the state’s attorney gen-
eral—disclosure of membership lists that he could easily use to gin up grounds 
for retaliation against the membership.101 It was the perception of that risk 
which made the Court’s decision to reverse the Alabama court’s order one of 
the most warmly greeted of its time, even though it is a bit of a stretch to 
wrench the notion of “freedom of association” out of the constitutional provi-
sion that protects the right of the people “peaceably” to assemble.102 The better 
way to approach that issue is to posit that the right to freedom of speech only 
makes sense if people can cooperate in a common venture to create and ad-
vance that speech. Accordingly, the First Amendment protection is linked to 
the standard justifications for freedom of association, which allow individuals 
to pool their resources in all lawful endeavors through joint effort. 
This point gains real immediacy in this case because we know that the Boy 
Scouts is an organization that is selective about its choice of members and the 
value structures to which they adhere. To treat an organization that has exten-
sive social and instructional activities as a common carrier is even more 
strained here than it was with Roberts, given the huge internal divisions within 
the organization regarding whether to keep the ban on gay scouts and troop 
leaders. At this point the losses to the insiders are truly large, which is one rea-
son why its internal blocs stand their ground, even against each other. The ul-
timate question therefore was whether New Jersey could apply its aggressive 
antidiscrimination law against the Boy Scouts, as the state court was prepared 
to do, taking note of the costs of discrimination on those excluded, but without 
reckoning on the benefits to the organization itself. 
 
100. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the 
Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1552-53 (2008) (proposing this view of Dale and 
discussing its implications). 
101. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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When the issue came to the Supreme Court, the calibers of analysis under 
modern constitutional law were changed. The decision of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court was reversed by a five-Justice majority because the Boy Scouts 
was not, in the Justices’ eyes, some nondescript, no-account organization like 
the Jaycees. Given the bifurcated structure of American constitutional law, the 
Boy Scouts could claim a higher level of protection as an expressive organiza-
tion by virtue of its explicitly moral orientation, which raised the case, perhaps, 
from the area of undifferentiated social liberties to that of a preferred freedom. 
In dealing with this issue, Justice Stevens in his dissent exhibited the fatal con-
fusion of claiming that only an organization that is passionate about its beliefs 
is entitled to claim special protection on freedom of association grounds. Un-
fortunately, that position then creates the unpleasant absurdity that a change of 
internal policy after major deliberation could strip an organization of its First 
Amendment rights.103 The decision thus has to be up or down on that question, 
and it was up by the small majority of five-to-four where the majority thought 
that the expressive nature of this organization exempted it from the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination.  
The question is what to make of this decision. To Bagenstos, Dale repre-
sents the camel’s nose under the tent. He thinks that it is the first step on a long-
term effort to use the First Amendment to dismantle Title II by insisting that all 
types of association are expressive and thus entitled to receive First Amend-
ment protection, on the ground, say, that “[s]erving an African American cus-
tomer in a restaurant side by side with white customers sends the message of 
equal citizenship of blacks and whites at least as strongly as admitting gay 
members to the Boy Scouts sends the message that homosexuality is accepta-
ble.”104 It is worth noting that no one in the thirteen years after Dale has sought 
to make this argument to overturn Title II. Indeed, the common response of 
Dale defenders on this point, as embodied in the work of Seana Shiffrin and 
Dale Carpenter, is to insist that the line between expressive and business asso-
ciations is clear enough that this slippage will never take place.105 Their sepa-
rate efforts to draw just this line are undoubtedly in good faith because they are 
both strong defenders of Title II as it applies to commercial situations, as 
 
103. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[The Boy Scouts] never took 
any clear and unequivocal position on homosexuality. . . . At a minimum, a group seeking to 
prevail over an antidiscrimination law must adhere to a clear and unequivocal view.”). For 
criticism of Justice Stevens’s dissent, see Epstein, supra note 96, at 138; and Seana Valen-
tine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 
845-51 (2005).  
104. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1229. 
105. See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After 
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1517-18 (2001); Shiffrin, supra note 
103, at 876-77. 
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Bagenstos himself notes.106 Given the attitude of the courts, I think that it is 
fair to say that politically this line will stand against future attacks.  
Even that prediction, however, does not answer the normative question of 
whether that line ought to stand once we move away from the restaurant situa-
tion to other situations that give rise to more serious disputes over policy objec-
tives and admission requirements for organizations like the Boy Scouts. On this 
score, Bagenstos has to explain why it is better to force the Boy Scouts to admit 
gay members, when in the aftermath of that decision members engaged in an 
immense internal struggle and worked hard to find the proper response to this 
burning dispute. Today gay members will be admitted to the Boy Scouts,107 
and the organization will not, or at least has not, imploded, its membership hav-
ing gone down only six percent.108 So the question remains, which resolution is 
preferable? A command-and-control operation from the states and the federal 
government or the imperfect give-and-take process of internal deliberation that 
produced results more successful than anyone on either side of the debate had 
dared to hope. It was only the decision in Dale that allowed this second, less 
coercive resolution. 
B. The Small Business Problem  
The remaining issue is whether or not the category of expressive organiza-
tions could, or should, extend to other commercial firms of all descriptions. I 
have already indicated that it is highly unlikely that anyone would wish to ap-
ply it to restaurant situations. But the same is not true with respect to a wide 
range of employments, some of which involve intimate, or at least deeply per-
sonal, interactions between employers and employees. In dealing with this 
 
106. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1231.  
107. Adele M. Banks, A Boy Scout Schism?, ONFAITH (May 28, 2013), 
http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2013/05/28/will-there-be-a-mass-exodus-of-religious-
groups-from-the-scouts/20866 (“Now that Boy Scout delegates have taken their long-
awaited vote and permitted openly gay Scouts, will there be a mass exodus by religious 
groups?”). The answer to the article’s question is probably “no.” 
108. A recent article noted: 
 The Boy Scouts of America experienced a modest dip in membership in 2013, but not the 
mass exodus that some social conservatives predicted while it was considering changing its 
membership policy on gays. 
 Boy Scouts membership fell by 6 percent last year, leaving it with nearly 2.5 million 
youth members and 960,000 adult members. 
 Reasons for the attrition, which is slightly greater than the 4 percent losses in 2012 and 
similar-sized declines in several previous years, are not fully understood but are likely related 
to the divisive vote on admitting openly gay youths to Scouts as well as a 60 percent increase 
in annual membership dues.  
Cheryl Wetzstein, Boy Scouts Shrink 6 Percent After 1 Year of Allowing Gay Members, 
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/12/boy-
scouts-shrink-6-percent-after-1-year-of-allowi. 
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question, Bagenstos takes issue with the position advanced by Carpenter and 
Shiffrin, and insists that the line between ordinary and expressive employments 
will be exceedingly difficult to maintain in practice given the wide range of 
business types along a continuum.109 Indeed, I think that Bagenstos is right on 
just this point for a wide range of establishments: think of health care personnel 
and personal trainers, contexts in which most people have deep preferences as 
to the people with whom they interact. There is no question that many custom-
ers use information about race, national origin, religion, sex, and sexual orien-
tation to decide whom to patronize. These choices are bundled in with deep no-
tions of identity politics. I know of no one who thinks that this set of customer 
choices should be limited by any human rights law. So why have a different 
rule on the opposite side of the relationship, where the preferences may in some 
cases be just as intense?  
To be sure, many people will say that businesses have a profit motive that 
makes them less willing to act on these preferences. But that is precisely the 
point. Knowing that in most cases they will be eager for business, the sensible 
result is to let them choose their own customers so that these choices will sort 
themselves out quite nicely. Where these identity issues do matter—largely in 
small firms, one suspects—the businesses may pay a financial price in order to 
act in accordance with their own beliefs. There is no need therefore to reserve 
any such associational privilege under the First Amendment to “expressive” ac-
tivities.  
It should be clear that I don’t think that Carpenter and Shiffrin are making 
some kind of strategic retreat because “they recognize that a frontal attack on 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act is a political nonstarter.”110 I think that they are 
making their argument in complete good faith because they believe that the dis-
tinction is both correct and sustainable. On that issue, however, I think that 
Bagenstos is correct—but only conceptually—that the line will not hold. Simi-
larly, my own position is not a sneaky attempt to challenge Title II. It is a 
frontal assault that rests on the explicit and emphatic defense of the older view 
that only the presence of monopoly power should trigger a generalized obliga-
tion of universal service on nondiscriminatory terms. In my view, any concep-
tual effort to subdivide associations into three separate categories, some of 
which receive higher levels of constitutional protection than others, is doomed 
 
109. See Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1208 (“[O]ngoing legal developments—both in 
the area of public accommodations law itself and in the litigation surrounding the Affordable 
Care Act’s ‘contraception mandate’—are poised to undermine this expressive-commercial 
distinction. If these challenges succeed, Dale’s freedom-of-association principles will threat-
en the core of public accommodations law—including, perhaps, Title II itself.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
110. Id. 
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to face not only serious line-drawing issues, but also the greater sin of intellec-
tual incoherence.  
Here is why. The standard theory of freedom of association writ large is 
that the members of the organization get to determine its purposes, its mode of 
operation, and the composition of its membership. So long as transaction costs 
are low, as they typically are, the refusal to deal does not represent any form of 
market failure, but only the revealed preferences that the gains to the outsiders 
are smaller than the perceived losses to the insiders. We make that conclusion 
not because we collectively weigh their preferences on some exquisite scales of 
justice, but because we observe that there has been no deal.  
In contrast, the modern view applies antidiscrimination laws to those or-
ganizations so long as they do not meet some state-determined standard of “ex-
pressiveness,” which flies directly in the face of that traditional understanding, 
and thus leads to the obvious question: what should be done in those cases in 
which standard business associations—family partnerships, private corpora-
tions, and small firms with single owners—are organized to serve both reli-
gious and secular ends, or whose principals seek to take into account their own 
religious beliefs in choosing the goods and services that they offer to the mar-
ket? This pattern of behavior is perfectly consistent with neoclassical econom-
ics, which recognizes that parties may choose to take the gains from coopera-
tive activities in nonpecuniary forms. It is not as if these organizations will go 
out of business; after all, they are not looking for the last dollar in market trans-
actions. But it does spell trouble down the road for these groups when faced 
with challenges as to how they interact with their customers.  
This point was brought home with great vividness in the recent New Mexi-
co decision, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, where the state supreme court 
applied its human rights law to a business owned by a fundamentalist Christian 
who refused to take pictures at a commitment ceremony—gay marriages are 
now recognized in New Mexico but were not at the time—between two lesbi-
ans, Vanessa Willock and Misti Collinsworth.111 It is worth stressing the up-
side-down quality of the New Mexico law. Antidiscrimination laws should be 
condemned because they force unwilling associations. The moral case for 
same-sex marriage rests on the very libertarian principles that are offended by 
 
111. 309 P.3d 53, 58-59 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). In another 
recent development, a Colorado administrate law judge refused to dismiss an antidiscrimina-
tion charge against a bakery that would not supply a wedding cake for a same-sex ceremony. 
The intrusion here seems smaller, but the whole point of a strong freedom of association 
principle is to keep the legislature or the courts from drawing these lines. See Craig v. Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n Dec. 6, 2013) 
(ALJ), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_ 
no._cr_2013-0008.pdf, aff’d, No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n May 30,  
2014) (final agency order), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/ 
masterpiece_--_commissions_final_order.pdf. 
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the New Mexico human rights laws. Marriage is an intimate form of associa-
tion that the state cannot forbid by the use of its monopoly power over the li-
censing system. Nor should any broad reading of the morals head of the police 
power upend that conclusion.112  
But for these purposes, the New Mexico Supreme Court took the sound-
ness of the law as given. Thus, as the facts unfolded, Willock put in a request 
that Elane Photography be the photographer for the event, which Elane 
Huguenin, co-owner and lead photographer, refused on clear religious grounds. 
At that point, Collinsworth followed up with an e-mail asking about Elane Pho-
tography’s availability, without disclosing that her request was for a same-sex 
commitment ceremony. Once Huguenin replied that the company was availa-
ble, she had irrefutable evidence that the earlier refusal was based on grounds 
of sexual orientation.113 The couple found services elsewhere, as one would 
expect in a competitive market as large as Albuquerque. But when the matter 
was turned over to the New Mexico Human Rights Commission, Elane Photog-
raphy was hit with a $6,637.94 award in attorney’s fees,114 which the plaintiffs 
later waived.115 But what of it? If this violation stands, Elane Photography is 
then at risk of future complaints by other potential claimants, and of fines from 
the New Mexico Human Rights Commission that can be collected. In effect, 
the result of this case could be to force Elane Photography to choose between 
violating its religious beliefs or going out of business, all as a result of a lawsuit 
that never should have been brought in the first place. Elane Photography is a 
classic version of the test-case setup. 
And for what? In looking at this case, it is clear that this was a deal that 
neither side wanted. Just imagine if Elane Photography had taken the job with-
out telling Willock and Collinsworth of Huguenin’s religious preferences, and 
Huguenin then had showed up bedecked with bold Christian paraphernalia and 
signaled to all the guests that she did not approve of the relationship. Why in-
vite anyone to a commitment ceremony who is not committed to the cause of 
which it is a part? On ceremonial occasions like this, the line between the per-
sonal and impersonal starts to blend. Notwithstanding this context, however, 
the New Mexico Supreme Court had no difficulty in deciding that “a commer-
cial photography business that offers its services to the public, thereby increas-
ing its visibility to potential clients, is subject to the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of the [New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA)] and must serve same-
 
112. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and Affirmative Ac-
tion: The Covert Libertarianism of the United States Supreme Court, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
75 (2004). 
113. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59-60. 
114. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 433 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), 
aff’d, 309 P.3d 53, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787. 
115. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 60. 
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sex couples on the same basis that it serves opposite-sex couples.”116 It stressed 
that the standard here is the same as it is with discrimination on grounds of 
race. It then rejected the First Amendment defense “because the NMHRA does 
not compel Elane Photography to either speak a government-mandated mes-
sage or to publish the speech of another.”117 With rare exceptions,118 liberal 
commentators commended the decision on the ground that the antidiscrimina-
tion laws would be gutted if all sorts of expressive commercial organizations 
could claim exemption from its operation.119 Libertarian groups have taken the 
opposite position, holding that the act of photography itself constitutes a form 
of expressive behavior that is indeed protected by the First Amendment.120 
 
116. Id. at 59. 
117. Id. 
118. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the 
Purpose of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
Andrew Koppelman writes: 
 Businesses that serve the public, such as wedding photographers, should be exempted, but 
only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly identifying themselves as discriminatory. 
That cost will make discrimination rare almost everywhere. Employers—some of whom also 
object to recognizing same-sex marriages—should not however be allowed to discriminate in 
providing benefits for their employees, such as denying health insurance to same-sex spous-
es. You can find another wedding photographer, but you only have one insurance plan. . . .  
 I’ve been a gay rights advocate for more than 25 years. Here, for the first time, I make 
common cause with my longtime adversaries. I’ve worked very hard to create a regime  
in which it’s safe to be gay. I’d also like that regime to be one that’s safe for religious  
dissenters. 
Id. I welcome Andrew Koppelman’s vigorous defense of Elane Photography, but have these 
observations about his overall position. First, I don’t think that the notice requirement will 
deter businesses like Elane Photography. They will instead announce that they welcome eve-
ryone’s business on all matters except gay weddings, which they refuse to do on grounds of 
religious conscience. Many people might come to them because they sympathize with the 
position. Second, I don’t think that Koppelman points to a viable distinction between wed-
ding photographers and employers. To be sure, there are fewer goods bundled into a short-
term stint with a photographer, but there is also extensive competition in labor markets. 
Workers can shift jobs, and they can surely acquire specialized coverages outside the em-
ployment relationships. Labor markets are not monopolistic, so that freedom of association 
should remain the rule. 
119. See Adam Serwer, The New Plot to Take Down Gay Rights, MSNBC (Sept. 
25, 2013, 5:40 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-new-plot-take-down-gay-rights 
(“‘It’s impossible to draw a line here between an expressive commercial service and a non-
expressive commercial service. Almost any commercial interaction we have today involves 
the expression of words or pictures or talking,’ said Josh Block, an attorney with the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union. ‘People once argued that they had a religious or associational 
right to refuse to serve black people in an integrated manner, and those claims were reject-
ed.’”). So if the line cannot be drawn, why use the antidiscrimination laws at all? In most 
cases they are not needed given business imperatives, so underenforcement is no insuperable 
obstacle, even if overenforcement is.  
120. Ilya Shapiro, We Support Gay Marriage but Oppose Forcing People to Support It, 
CATO AT LIBERTY (Nov. 2, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/we-support-gay-
marriage-oppose-forcing-people-support-it. 
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That position was argued with great conviction by Dale Carpenter, Eugene 
Volokh, and the Cato Institute, who claimed that photography is an expressive 
activity that should receive First Amendment protection,121 relying on both Jus-
tice Jackson’s famous opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette122 and the Court’s well-known decision in Wooley v. Maynard.123 De-
spite the Supreme Court refusing to grant certiorari, I commend these efforts 
because of their laudable attempt to shoehorn associational freedoms into the 
First Amendment, but recognize all too well that Bagenstos has a field day in 
explaining all the complications that will result in policing the line: “As anyone 
who has ever hired a caterer for a wedding, bar mitzvah, or other occasion 
knows, catering has inevitably expressive elements.”124 The typical wedding 
must have dozens of contractors.125 Is it only the camera crew that is protected? 
What about the makers of the wedding cake and the car valet staff? 
Bagenstos’s colorful prose should, however, lead him to endorse the exact 
opposite conclusion. Why face these issues of classification as a matter of pub-
lic law when the parties in this fiercely competitive business can sort matters 
out themselves? There are few error costs, given market pressures, in defending 
freedom of association across the board, and massive disruptions caused by de-
fending the NMHRA, which tramples over the all-too-human right of freedom 
of association. As a matter of first principles, there should be no need to locate 
these cases on the right side of the Dale line that for legal purposes ought not to 
exist in the first place. Normatively, the correct rule is that freedom of associa-
tion is a generalizable value that holds in all competitive markets; the effort to 
apply the antidiscrimination laws in that domain is a giant form of overreach, 
no matter whether the lines of difference are race, religion, or sexual orienta-
tion. This position applies a fortiori to those persons who reject a request for 
services on bona fide religious grounds, but it is not limited to them. This posi-
tion also applies to all sorts of services, not some subclass like photography that 
may just be given preferred First Amendment status on freedom of speech 
grounds. There is virtually zero risk of systematic exclusion when competitive 
substitutes are available, so that using the broad freedom of association princi-
ple produces few error costs. If most organizations regard these distinctions as 
abhorrent, it is all the more important to allow those who differ to go their sepa-
rate ways. Customers have lots of options to choose from, while the practition-
ers of certain beliefs have few choices of their own if forced to engage in prac-
 
121. See Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Inst., Eugene Volokh, & Dale Carpenter in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 3, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2013) (No. 13-
585), 2013 WL 6665006. 
122. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
123. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
124. Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 1235.  
125. See id.  
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tices that they find offensive to their religious beliefs in order to stay in busi-
ness. 
Nor is it possible to sugarcoat the New Mexico court’s ruling by claiming 
that Elane Photography brought the law down upon itself when it opened its 
business to the public. The argument, which has a long history in civil rights 
litigation, claims that the phrase “offers its services to the public” carries with it 
the clear implication that Elane Photography accepted the duty not to discrimi-
nate the moment it opened its doors for business. Put otherwise, no one who is 
in favor of this law thinks that it could be avoided if below “open for business” 
was the sentence “we reserve the right to choose our own customers.” (Ironical-
ly, the New Mexico Supreme Court said that Elane Photography could post a 
notice that it will respect the law that it doesn’t agree with.)126 Note that this 
sentence could not be posted by a common carrier that indeed has just that duty 
to serve on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. That difference in the two 
settings is recognized by the common law distinction between offers and invita-
tions to treat,127 such that it is not credible to say that Elane Photography has 
somehow voluntarily offered its services to any or all members of the public.  
That outcome represents, moreover, the standard position in competitive 
markets that each person—whether merchant or customer—is the master of his 
offer; the firm has the unqualified right to turn down any business proposition, 
just as the potential customer can choose for whatever reason the firms that it 
wants to deal with. Surely Willock has no duty to accept Elane Photography’s 
offer to work on any project whatsoever if she takes offense at its policy not to 
photograph gay marriages—no questions asked. That right is shared by all oth-
er members of the public. No one claims that someone who puts out a request 
for services has committed herself to hire a contractor without regard to his re-
ligious or sexual preferences. It is therefore odd to posit some “humiliation and 
dignitary harm”128 as a trump on the side of a disappointed customer, without 
recognizing that the mandated services now impose humiliation and dignitary 
harm on business proprietors who are also human beings: why else is Elane 
Photography fighting this case? These issues are hot. They can spur widespread 
boycotts and other actions against the firm—think of Chick-fil-A.129 The deci-
sion to override private associational preferences based on the allegation of soft 
 
126. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59. 
127. See Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 
(Minn. 1957); Moulton v. Kershaw, 18 N.W. 172, 173 (Wis. 1884). 
128. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 64. 
129. See, e.g., Kim Severson, A Chicken Chain’s Corporate Ethos Is Questioned by 
Gay Rights Advocates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/us/ 
30chick.html?pagewanted=all (describing gay rights advocates’ attacks on the firm for its 
anti-same-sex marriage position). 
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harm thus founders. Those harms are created on the one side in the attempt to 
limit them on the other. 
The correct analysis therefore requires looking at both sides of the relation-
ship before making some judgment on both social efficacy and dignitary harms. 
That point is also correct on more general grounds. The first point is that it is 
likely that Willock and Collinsworth could not pay enough money to Elane 
Photography to overcome its objection. Nor could Elane Photography pay 
enough to Willock and Collinsworth to make them change their minds. This 
dispute is not over money, but fundamental values. But what lesson can be 
learned from the observation that it is difficult for two parties to bargain them-
selves out of impasses? In this situation, the correct default rule is that the two 
sides go their separate ways. 
That choice of default rule becomes more salient as the number of potential 
parties increases. Thus if Elane Photography is under a duty to serve all com-
ers, it cannot not afford to buy off the long queue of gay and lesbian couples 
that come to its door asking for financial payment. But if Elane Photography 
has the right to exclude for any reason, then selective admission of chosen per-
sons becomes the norm on which free association can rest. So giving owners 
the right to exclude others reduces the bargaining complications that would 
otherwise ensue, which in turn eases the path to competitive markets as others 
jump in and offer to serve the customers that Elane Photography will not. The 
point here applies across the board. It is not an answer to say that by this logic 
Elane Photography could refuse to serve black customers, which is within its 
rights, just as it is for any firm to refuse to serve white customers, or to refuse 
to serve any firm that does not engage in a systematic policy of nondiscrimina-
tion. Once again, the principle of freedom of association applies across the 
board once the issues of monopolization and the abuse of state power are put to 
one side. In all cases, competitive firms will fill the supposed gap. 
The overall system works far better with strong property rights and of 
course the strong protection of individual autonomy in all personal dealings. It 
is for that reason that in ordinary property arrangements elsewhere, it is the du-
ty of the outsider to win consent, not the duty of the owner to buy off all out-
siders that she does not wish to admit. So the standard rule is that the cattle 
owner has to keep the cattle out of the farmer’s land, and not the other way 
around. Armed with the right to exclude, the landowner can decide which, if 
any, outsider to let in to graze on his land.130 Those who do not like the situa-
tion can go elsewhere. Elane Photography does not have any dominant market 
position in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Huguenin should be allowed to run her 
business in peace. 
 
130. Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 172-74 (1987). 
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The question then arises as to what should be done going forward. In one 
sense the damage was already done once the New Mexico Human Rights 
Commission put the issue in play. In retrospect, it should have just ducked the 
issue by invoking the constitutional doctrine of avoidance given the inevitable 
clash of this human rights law with religious liberties. At this point, the matter 
might have been defused without inviting frontal assaults on Title II. But once 
on the books, Elane Photography provoked many conservative and religious 
organizations to back an extension of Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion 
Act131 to cover not just religious assemblies or entities, but also ordinary indi-
viduals, associations, partnerships, and corporations. One such bill, Arizona 
Senate Bill 1062,132 passed, only to be vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer who 
stated, correctly in my view, that the bill “has the potential to create more prob-
lems than it purports to solve.”133 She did so on the urging of prominent politi-
cal leaders—including Arizona Republican Senators John McCain and Jeff 
Flake, and former Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney—as well as 
major corporate and business interests, “including Delta Air Lines, the Super 
Bowl host committee and Major League Baseball,” which feared a backlash 
against the state.134 
There is at least one deep irony in this collective rejection of Arizona Sen-
ate Bill 1062. The firms and individuals who opposed the legislation had no de-
sire whatsoever to take advantage of its protections. That fact alone explains 
why the bill itself posed no threat to the established patterns of business. In-
deed, if the governor had signed off on the bill, all companies that were uneasy 
with the new state of affairs could have taken binding pledges to continue to do 
business just as if the legislation had never passed. Their behavior makes out 
 
131. Ch. 332, 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1769 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2014)). Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act is modeled 
off the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4), invalidated by City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA was held unconstitutional as it applies to the 
states in City of Boerne on the ground that it sought to give primacy to Congress’s interpreta-
tion of the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the last word on that 
question belonged to the Supreme Court. See 521 U.S. at 536. But the law continues to apply 
against the federal government, where no constitutional issue is raised. See Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424, 439 (2006). In addition, at 
last count, nineteen states have enacted state analogs to RFRA. See Reid Wilson, Mississippi 
Passes Arizona-Style Religious Freedom Bill, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2014, 9:18 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/04/01/mississippi-passes-arizona-
style-religious-freedom-bill. 
132. S.B. 1062, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2014).  
133. Catherine E. Shoichet & Halimah Abdullah, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes Con-
troversial Anti-Gay Bill, SB 1062, CNN (Feb. 26, 2014, 11:13 PM EST), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bill. 
134. Id. 
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the case for why the legislation is in principle unnecessary. But these firms 
were only interested in returning to the settled set of social expectations that 
antedated the legislation.  
There is much pragmatic sense in their position. As I have argued else-
where, constant practice may give rise to a prescriptive constitutional right that 
is formed in much the same way as the long use of a right-of-way can create a 
prescriptive easement.135 But as with prescription, the right should only go as 
far as the established social practice, which has never covered situations like 
Elane Photography, where the equities between the parties lie so much in favor 
of the firm. No doctrine of settled expectations should sanction this new legis-
lative development. Indeed, the case for protection starts with the observation 
that now Elane Photography is part of a discrete and insular minority under 
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.136 Its minority reli-
gious views need constitutional space between it and the relentless ambitions of 
an ascendant gay rights movement that seems to have quickly forgotten that its 
members were once on the receiving end of the unthinking and abusive exer-
cise of state criminal law. Nothing in the court’s decision in Elane Photography 
allays this fear of a new wave of authoritarian abuse. 
This pragmatic plea for the status quo ante leaves untouched the question 
of how this issue should be resolved as a matter of first principles. On that 
score there is no reason to be coy or pragmatic. As a matter of first principles, 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act should be regarded as unconstitutional as ap-
plied to all voluntary organizations in well-functioning markets. Civil rights 
laws are turned upside down when used to harass small businesses with minori-
ty viewpoints. At this point, the Robert Bork of 1963, who was so wrong about 
public accommodations in the Old South, is unhappily vindicated by the care-
less way in which statutory duties to serve are extended far beyond their origi-
nal purpose of coping with monopoly power in common carrier situations. 
 
135. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN 
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 68-71 (2014). 
136. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Recall the basic passage, which was written in the 
context of a futile challenge to a filled milk regulation, just after the 1937 revolution:  
 It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political pro-
cesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to 
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation . . . . 
 Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes di-
rected at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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V. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION 
The decision to pick on small and isolated groups is not just a function of 
antidiscrimination law as it applies to private parties. It has also arisen in con-
nection with government actions that overtly and consciously discriminate 
against small groups that wish to retain their organizational preferences. In the-
se cases, the dominant question involves the actual or potential application of 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.137 That principle states in its canon-
ical form that even if the state has the power to grant or deny a certain privi-
lege, it may not have the power to grant that privilege contingent on certain 
conditions that are constitutionally suspect. The scope of the doctrine is broad 
because it arises whenever the government exerts monopoly power or control 
over some essential facility normally open to the public at large. In constitu-
tional language, these cases of government ownership often involve the opera-
tion of public forums, including streets, parks, and halls, where people are al-
lowed to congregate. In all of these cases it has long been held that  
[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, 
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liber-
ties of citizens.138  
The reference to the public trust in this case is the signal that fiduciary du-
ties are involved so that the state cannot pick and choose between the groups 
that are allowed to engage in political activity on public premises. In essence, 
there is no particular obligation to open the premises to all comers, but there is 
a duty to act in a fair and nondiscriminatory way with respect to said groups, 
whose conduct is only subject to time, place, and manner restrictions.  
It thus becomes clear that in allowing groups to enter onto the public high-
way, the relevant government authorities cannot discriminate among potential 
applicants on the grounds of their own political or associational preferences. 
For example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston the question was whether the Massachusetts public accommodations 
law could require the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council to include the 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual group in its parade, to which the answer was “no.”139 
The state as the holder of the monopoly resource—here the streets—is under 
the nondiscrimination duty to all comers, including those private groups that 
discriminate on grounds that offend the Massachusetts statute. In effect, Hurley 
 
137. For my views, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 3-12 (1993). 
138. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of  
Roberts, J.). 
139. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
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is a modern instantiation of the earlier and proper application of the nondis-
crimination principle against the state. 
A narrow majority of the Supreme Court lost sight of this lesson in Chris-
tian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law v. Martinez, where the scene of action switched to Hastings College of 
Law, which acted to exclude a tiny Christian Legal Society (CLS) chapter from 
various privileges that were extended to other Hastings groups on the ground 
that CLS required its members to affirm that they adhered to the teachings of 
Jesus Christ and were opposed to “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”140 There 
is no question that a private institution in Hastings’s position should be allowed 
freedom over whom to admit and the terms on which that admission should be 
based. There is no doubt that if Hastings sought to exclude fundamentalist 
Christians from its student body, that total ban would amount to a form of 
viewpoint discrimination that would be struck down. But as a public institution 
that doles out public subsidies, it is much more closely analogous to a state 
monopoly because of its ability to tap into public funds to support its opera-
tions. The question then arises why, in this “limited public forum” to which on-
ly Hastings students were invited,141 it could exclude this tiny group from the 
usual benefits and privileges that Hastings bestowed on more powerful groups, 
including Outlaw, a society of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender stu-
dents.142  
In defending that result, Justice Ginsburg insisted that Hastings could ex-
clude from its list of “Registered Student Organizations” all groups that refused 
to adopt an “accept-all-comers policy” on the ground that said policy “encour-
ages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students.”143 But she never 
explained why an organization had to admit into membership individuals who 
did not share its fundamental mission. CLS was a tiny group vulnerable to po-
litical crosswinds in a sea of hostile students. It was quite willing to allow oth-
ers to attend its meetings, but not to join its governance structure, which is ex-
actly right. The organization could not survive once a fifth column was 
guaranteed membership rights, which it could use to stack the organization with 
its own supporters.144 Justice Ginsburg thought that it was one thing merely to 
exclude people from benefits and another to impose direct losses upon them.145 
 
140. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). For my views, 
see generally Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Soci-
ety v. Martinez, 2009-2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105 (2010). 
141. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2991-92.  
142. 1 Joint Appendix at 236-45, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371), 
2010 WL 372139 (listing “Registered Student Organizations”). 
143. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978-79 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
144. See id. at 3019-20 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
145. See id. at 2986. 
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She would never take that position for law schools that wanted to exclude so-
cialists from the faculty or student body. But the choices that are allowed to 
private institutions in competitive markets are not available to state-run institu-
tions that receive subsidies and other forms of public support for which there is 
no private alternative available to CLS or anyone else.  
The key point about the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is that it 
limits the power of state choice when the state acts as a common carrier in the 
use of its monopoly power. The only justifications that allow for discrimination 
are those that the state could apply through direct regulation of private activi-
ties. It could refuse to allow groups to join if they posed the threat of force or 
fraud. Otherwise the only difference between the open public forum in Hague 
v. Committee for Industrial Organization and Hurley and the limited public fo-
rum of Hastings is that admission (under nondiscriminatory rules) can be re-
stricted to potential law students, who as a group have privileges above and be-
yond those granted to outsiders. Within this framework it is clear that the great 
tragedy of Christian Legal Society is that it allows the government to act as a 
discriminating monopolist against weak and vulnerable groups, precisely be-
cause, as in Elane Photography, the government forces those small groups to 
toe its own collectivist line on discrimination. How quickly we forget. 
Nor is this an isolated instance. One current battle with the health care law 
is whether the statute can force religious institutions to supply contraception 
and abortion services to female employees even if it is inconsistent with the re-
ligious beliefs of the organization, usually as represented by its dominant fami-
ly shareholders.146 That debate is extensive and wide ranging, and it is often 
cast in terms of whether the “boss” should be able to determine the sexual prac-
tices of female employees.147 But the reality is that the “boss” in this case is the 
government that seeks to force organizations to make expenditures that they 
don’t want in order to serve state but not private ends. In this case too, the cor-
rect response is for the government to understand that it cannot condition its 
grants and regulations on any idea that suits its fancy. Instead it must follow the 
widely rejected principle that in exercise of its monopoly power, it cannot deny 
government benefits to practices that it could not ban directly,148 which covers 
this case. Antidiscrimination laws should never be used as a government club 
against recalcitrant individuals in their everyday lives. 
 
146. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.) (en 
banc) (presenting this issue), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
147. For a brief account, see EPSTEIN, supra note 135, at 470-75. 
148. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (conceding 
that the school’s decision to ban interracial dating was constitutionally protected, but that its 
right to a religious tax exemption was not). 
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AN UNHAPPY CONCLUSION  
In the English language the word “discrimination” once had two meanings, 
the first of which is in danger of being lost. In its positive sense, discrimination 
refers to persons of taste and discrimination who can draw the right lines for 
setting preferences of places to go, things to like, and people to choose as com-
pany. In its negative and now standard sense, discrimination is always against 
some group, where it is thought that some bad or invidious motive accounts for 
the behavior.  
There is some truth to both of these definitions, and the task of legal an-
alysis is to decide when this or that form of discrimination should be allowed. It 
is very risky to permit any single group, public or private, to be the arbiter of 
good or bad taste. So the ultimate lesson to learn here is to try to decentralize 
the use of power in good Hayekian fashion,149 which in turn requires an extra 
dollop of suspicion in organizing social relationships. The common law re-
sponse to this development, which was to impose duties of nondiscrimination 
on parties with monopoly power over relatively commoditized goods and ser-
vices, was a good first cut into this problem. It meant that people could not be 
kept out of railroads and off the electrical grid, but it also allowed all private 
groups to select their own members and govern their own organizations when 
they provided uniquely differentiated services in competitive markets. That rep-
resents in my view the correct division between government regulation and pri-
vate freedom of association. 
Those principles in part drove the earlier applications of Title II of the Civ-
il Rights Act, where a combination of public abuse of essential facilities and 
private violence posed a mortal threat to the individual liberties of vulnerable 
citizens, often on grounds of race. Title II of the Civil Rights Act offered a sen-
sible first response in this respect. But with the increase in power of the civil 
rights movement, the more recent applications of antidiscrimination law have 
had a very different purpose. There have been many aggressive attempts to 
achieve state-mandated nondiscrimination over a wide range of business and 
social institutions that are bereft of monopoly power and that have distinctive 
purposes and objectives that rightly resist any form of state standardization. In 
this sphere, the situation is topsy-turvy. Antidiscrimination law now is a threat 
to the diversity of our private institutions. It allows the state to impose nondis-
crimination obligations on weak and powerless individuals, institutions, and 
firms that only wish to be left alone. It then compounds the mischief by insist-
ing that its key control over basic public facilities allows it to impose its will on 
private institutions that are powerless to resist its combination of direct controls 
and fines. It is indeed a sorry state of affairs that a great norm intended to blunt 
 
149. See Hayek, supra note 21, at 526. 
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private power has now become a tool to allow all-too-powerful institutions to 
stamp out those groups that oppose their vision of the good society.  
I have no doubt that any group that wishes to buck the dominant social sen-
timent must face the risk that it will lose popularity and business to people who 
are offended by its views. The application of public opinion in just that regard 
is an essential safeguard of our social institutions, but only so long as those 
same sentiments are allowed to the minority group that wishes to distance itself 
from the majority. There should be free and open competition in the world of 
ideas and behavior. But it also must be remembered that this process need not 
generate a unity of views on key questions of gay rights any more than it must 
generate a uniform view of whether Macs are better than PCs, or the reverse. 
The interplay of social forces is well equipped to figure out what distribution of 
power goes to which group. 
The modern application of public accommodations and human rights laws 
pushes too far and too fast in the wrong direction. There is little doubt that sex 
discrimination has become a dirty word in many quarters. It is equally clear that 
the opponents of gay marriage are losing the public debate as well. It is surely 
correct to support gay marriage for the reasons noted above. The state has a 
monopoly over marriage licenses and should not discriminate between various 
candidates for marriage, which is why libertarian organizations are and should 
be firm supporters of requiring the state not to discriminate between couples in 
its exercise of monopoly power. But the state becomes the source of discrimi-
nation when it fines and punishes those who wish to exercise their own rights 
of association. Those rights should be broad and firm. They should not depend 
on whether an organization is or is not expressive, is or is not religious in orien-
tation, or is or is not engaged in political speech. Our authoritarian human 
rights acts have to be recalibrated so that they protect one of the most funda-
mental of human rights—the right to associate, or not to associate, with people 
of one’s own choosing. It is that lesson that we have to relearn on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
 1292 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1241 
 
 
 
